Insurance Risk Classification in an Era of Genomics: Is a Rational Discrimination Policy Rational? by Prince, Anya E.R.
Nebraska Law Review
Volume 96 | Issue 3 Article 4
2018
Insurance Risk Classification in an Era of
Genomics: Is a Rational Discrimination Policy
Rational?
Anya E.R. Prince
University of Iowa College of Law, anya-prince@uiowa.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.
Recommended Citation
Anya E.R. Prince, Insurance Risk Classification in an Era of Genomics: Is a Rational Discrimination Policy Rational?, 96 Neb. L. Rev. 624
(2017)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol96/iss3/4
Anya E.R. Prince*
Insurance Risk Classification in an
Era of Genomics: Is a Rational
Discrimination Policy Rational?
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 625
II. Theoretcial Underpinnings and Foundation of Insurance
Regulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 630
III. Policy Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 634
A. Prohibitive Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 635
B. Status Quo Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 638
C. Rational Discrimination Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 641
1. United Kingdom Moratorium and Concordat . . . 642
2. Australian Guidance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 643
3. U.S. Uniform Law Commission Proposal . . . . . . . 644
IV. Risk Classification and Economic Efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . 645
A. Classifying Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 645
B. Why Insurers Classify Risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 647
C. Choosing a Risk Characteristic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 649
1. Statistical Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 650
2. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 651
3. Social Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 652
V. Genetic Test Results and Insurance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 655
A. Genetic Test Results as Risk Characteristics . . . . . . . 655
B. Current Use of Genetic Test Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 660
1. Insurer Access to Genetic Test Results . . . . . . . . . 661
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW. If you would like to submit a re-
sponse to this Article in the Nebraska Law Review Bulletin, contact our Online
Editor at lawrev@unl.edu.
* Associate Professor, University of Iowa College of Law. Research reported in this
publication was supported by the National Human Genome Research Institute of
the National Institutes of Health (NIH) under Award Number K99HG008819.
The content is solely the responsibility of the author and does not necessarily
represent the official views of the NIH. I thank Gail Henderson, Jim Evans,
Debra Skinner, John Conley, Joan Krause, Rich Saver, and Rick Sanders for
feedback throughout this project and the faculty at Saint Louis University Law
School for workshopping a draft. Additionally, I wish to thank Nicholas Geor-
gakopoulos for the use of his macros and templates.
624
2018] INSURANCE RISK CLASSIFICATION 625
2. Insurer Use of Genetic Test Results . . . . . . . . . . . . 662
VI. Are Transparency and Oversight Necessary? . . . . . . . . . . . 663
A. Insurer Misuse of Genetic Test Results . . . . . . . . . . . . 664
B. Transparency of the Insurance Market . . . . . . . . . . . . . 665
C. The Arms Race of Risk Classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 666
D. Fear of Genetic Discrimination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 668
VII. Standards of Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 671
A. Uniform Law Commission Draft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 671
B. U.K. Moratorium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 673
C. Australian Guidance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 674
D. Additional Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 675
1. What Types of Evidence Are Sufficient? . . . . . . . . 675
2. How Should the Context of Genetic Tests Come
into Play? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 676
3. Should Relevance Be Measured by Marginal
Added Value? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 678
4. How Should Preventive and Treatment
Measures Be Taken into Account? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 679
5. How Should Variants Within a Gene Be
Considered? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 680
VIII. The Case for a Rational Discrimination Approach . . . . . . 682
A. Prohibitive Approach Comparision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 683
B. Status Quo Consideration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 684
IX. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 686
I. INTRODUCTION
There is continuing societal debate about whether insurers should
be able to collect, access, or use genetic test results when considering
applications or setting premium and coverage levels.1 This debate cen-
1. See, e.g., Robert Klitzman et al., Should Life Insurers Have Access to Genetic Test
Results?, 312 JAMA 1855 (2014); Kira Peikoff, Fearing Punishment for Bad
Genes, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2014, at D1, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/08/sci-
ence/fearing-punishment-for-bad-genes.html?_r=0; Francis S. Collins, Questions
on Genetic Tests Remain; Some Rules Should Be Clear, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 14,
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/04/14/dna-and-insurance-
fate-and-risk/questions-on-genetic-tests-remain-some-rules-should-be-clear
[https://perma.unl.edu/6W8S-X9CE]; Jeremy Gruber, Guarantee Privacy to En-
sure Proper Genetic Treatment, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 14, 2014), http://www.nytimes
.com/roomfordebate/2014/04/14/dna-and-insurance-fate-and-risk/guarantee-pri-
vacy-to-ensure-proper-genetic-treatment; Joy Larsen Haidle, Genetic Test Results
Are Not Always What They Seem, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 14, 2014), http://www.nytimes
.com/roomfordebate/2014/04/14/dna-and-insurance-fate-and-risk/genetic-test-re-
sults-are-not-always-what-they-seem [https://perma.unl.edu/4H9X-E58Y];
Shawn Hausman, Let Insurers Have Data and Trust to Get It Right, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 14, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/04/14/dna-and-in-
surance-fate-and-risk/let-insurers-have-data-and-trust-to-get-it-right [https://per
ma.unl.edu/54GP-M27R]; Bartha Maria Knoppers, It’s Yet to Be Shown that Ge-
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ters around deeply rooted beliefs over the privacy and personal nature
of genetic information on the one hand and the financial necessities
and economic considerations of the insurance industry on the other.
Insurers argue access to applicants’ genetic test results is essential for
the industry’s financial security. However, public distrust of insurance
companies, coupled with anecdotal evidence of individuals unable to
secure insurance, led to calls for barring insurers from considering ge-
netic test results and, in the context of health insurance, the realiza-
tion of this goal.2 In 2008, Congress passed the Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act (GINA), which bars covered health insurers
and employers from collecting and using genetic information.3 Other
insurers, such as life, long-term care, and disability insurers, are ex-
empt from the law.4  Since GINA’s passage, continued suggestions
have been raised to expand legislation to these other insurances, but
to date regulation has been limited, variable, and confined to the state
level.5 It remains an open question whether and how the use of ge-
netic test results by life, long-term care, and disability insurers should
be circumscribed.
Across the globe, countries similarly struggle to balance public and
insurance industry concerns. In many countries, especially those that
have universal or national health care and insurance systems, the de-
bate has focused on the types of insurances excluded from GINA, such
as life, disability income, and critical illness insurance.6 In a survey of
netic Discrimination Exists, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 14, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/
roomfordebate/2014/04/14/dna-and-insurance-fate-and-risk/its-yet-to-be-shown-
that-genetic-discrimination-exists [https://perma.unl.edu/PH6Y-KN82];  Angus
S. MacDonald, Risks Are Too Small for Insurers to Worry, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 14,
2014) [hereinafter MacDonald, Risks Are Too Small], http://www.nytimes.com/
roomfordebate/2014/04/14/dna-and-insurance-fate-and-risk/risks-are-too-small-
for-insurers-to-worry [https://perma.unl.edu/D2A5-56EA].
2. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233,
122 Stat. 881 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C).
3. Id.
4. Id. This Article primarily discusses life, long-term care, and disability insurers,
the three types of insurance lines where information about increased risk for
morbidity and mortality are most likely to be relevant. However, as genetic test-
ing becomes more pervasive in society, other lines of insurance, such as home-
owners or travel insurance, could integrate genetic test results into underwriting.
In the international context, these types of insurances covering morbidity or mor-
tality have varying names, such as critical illness insurance.
5. See, e.g., Amy L. McGuire & Mary Anderlik Majumder, Two Cheers for GINA?, 1
GENOME MED. 6 (2009); Anya E.R. Prince, Comprehensive Protection of Genetic
Information: One Size Privacy or Property Models May Not Fit All, 79 BROOK. L.
REV. 175 (2013); Mark A. Rothstein, Genetic Exceptionalism and Legislative
Pragmatism, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 59 (2007).
6. See, e.g., Yann Joly et al., Genetic Discrimination in Private Insurance: Global
Perspectives, 29 NEW GENETICS & SOC’Y 351, 351 (2010) (noting that the public
nature of many countries’ health insurance programs has moved focus of the de-
bate to private insurances, such as life insurance).
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international policy approaches addressing insurer use of genetic in-
formation, Yann Joly and colleagues identified six intersecting and
overlapping approaches often employed.7 Three of these approaches
relate specifically to whether insurers can access all, some, or no ge-
netic test results—labeled status quo, rational discrimination, and
prohibitive approaches, respectively.8
Under a status quo approach, insurers set their own standards for
which genetic tests they will gather and use.9 This approach is pre-
mised on the fact that the overarching goal of the insurance market is
to assess applicants’ risks in order to offer a premium that is commen-
surate with risk level and is economically viable.10 Additionally, since
insurance companies are in the business of attracting customers, they
have an incentive to assess risk as accurately as possible.11 For these
two reasons, a status quo approach allows insurers to create their own
rules for use of risk characteristics,12 implicitly trusting the insurers
to use available data responsibly. In contrast, under a prohibitive ap-
proach, insurers are barred from accessing or using genetic test re-
sults.13  Such legislation prioritizes social arguments that insurer use
of genetic information is unfair, may violate privacy concerns, or may
discourage individuals from undertaking medically recommended ge-
netic testing.
The rational discrimination approach stands as a middle ground
between the status quo and prohibitive approaches. Here, insurers are
allowed to use a subset of genetic tests that meet established stan-
dards of scientific, clinical, and actuarial significance.14 Given current
scientific knowledge, this subset of tests may actually be quite small.
Overwhelmingly, genetic test results do not provide insurers with
helpful risk information. Despite promises, current clinical under-
standing of genetics is, for the most part, lackluster at best in its abil-
ity to accurately predict risk.15 Although some genetic tests can
identify individuals at high risk for conditions such as cancer or
neurodegenerative diseases, this is a small subset of overall genetic
7. Id. at 355–56 (labeling the approaches as fair limits, human rights, prohibitive,
moratorium, rational discrimination, and status quo).
8. Id. at 356.
9. Id.
10. Hausman, supra note 1.
11. See infra section VI.C.
12. Joly et al., supra note 6, at 356.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. James P. Evans et al., Deflating the Genomic Bubble, 331 SCIENCE 861, 861
(2011); Angus S. MacDonald, Genetic Factors in Life Insurance: Actuarial Basis 1,
in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LIFE SCIENCES (2009) [hereinafter MacDonald, Genetic
Factors].
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information.16 Much of the information arising from genetic tests is
vulnerable to misinterpretation17 and will arguably have a small ef-
fect on aggregate health18 and insurance markets.19 Therefore, a ra-
tional discrimination approach narrows insurer use to only those tests
that meet established criteria and are helpful in risk prediction.
A rational discrimination approach was implemented in the United
Kingdom in the early 2000s, and versions of the approach have been
proposed in the United States and Australia.20 Additionally, United
Kingdom and Australia policies place an independent body as a medi-
ator in actuarial decisions, and an external committee must approve
the genetic tests before insurer use is permitted. This Article exam-
ines the merits and drawbacks of a rational discrimination approach
to address life, long-term care, and disability insurer use of genetic
test results. It argues a rational discrimination approach should be
adopted as a necessary baseline protection against misuse of genetic
test results, while allowing insurers access to and use of genetic test
results that have met sufficient scientific, clinical, and actuarial
evidence.
Part II begins with an overview of two theoretical underpinnings of
insurance—social fairness and actuarial fairness—and examines how
these theories have been employed in U.S. insurance law. Social fair-
ness focuses on insurance as solidarity; ensuring access to insurance
coverage is a paramount goal. In contrast, actuarial fairness, also
called fair discrimination, seeks to treat equal risks equally and une-
qual risks unequally. Part III applies these theoretical frameworks to
genetic test results. It discusses in greater depth the three policy ap-
proaches employed to address insurer use of genetic test results—a
prohibitive approach, a rational discrimination approach, and the sta-
tus quo.
Part IV discusses the economic considerations that motivate risk
classification. Risk classification is the process of gathering informa-
tion, referred to as “characteristics,” about an applicant, assessing
how these characteristics affect risk, and placing applicants into risk
classes that dictate premium and coverage levels. Historically, insur-
ers used data for a relatively small number of characteristics, such as
age, gender, and occupation, to assess individuals’ risk and assign pre-
16. See infra section V.A (discussing the vast variety of types of genetic tests and
information stemming from sequencing).
17. Haidle, supra note 1.
18. Evans et al., supra note 15.
19. Gruber, supra note 1; MacDonald, Risks Are Too Small, supra note 1.
20. This guidance was drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form Laws, the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC), and the Australian
Health Ethics Committee of the National Health and Medical Research Council
(AHEC), respectively. They will be discussed in further detail infra subsection
III.C.2.
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miums; however, over time, this process of risk classification became
more refined as increasing information from medical exams and lifes-
tyle are factored into risk assessment.21 The technical realm of risk
classification is imbued with subjectivity. Thus, this Part foreshadows
areas where a rational discrimination approach can ensure appropri-
ate standards are met. The following Part discusses how insurers cur-
rently access and use genetic test results. Precision medicine and
advancing genetic technologies further expand the possible informa-
tion available to insurers challenging existing regulatory frameworks
and bounds of fair use of data.
Some have argued that because it is in the insurers’ best interests
to avoid misuse of genetic test results, market forces should obviate
the need for additional oversight. Part VI responds by arguing the
market is an insufficient check on the system due to the burden placed
on consumers, the competitive pressures insurers face to more nar-
rowly refine risk classes and capture low-risk customers, the differ-
ences between insurance markets and other competitive markets, and
the failure of the market to address fear of genetic discrimination.
Finding the rational discrimination approach provides a balanced
mechanism to address these concerns, Part VII delineates the stan-
dards for determining scientific, clinical, and actuarial relevance used
or recommended by the United States, the United Kingdom, and Aus-
tralia. Part VII proposes five additional areas of inquiry necessary in
any determination of actuarial relevance for genetic test results. As
discussed in Part VIII, the rational discrimination approach is a com-
promise that does not address all concerns of the public or of insurers.
This Part, however, maintains this approach is an appropriate bal-
ance between the two positions and may in fact be beneficial for both.
A rational discrimination approach balances the economic needs of
insurers with the social concerns of the public. As one regulator
quipped, “The math of correlation can be so lovely. Because math is
blind and so the math must be fair. The math can’t be biased because
it doesn’t know who you are, but it does know all about you.”22 Assess-
ing risk can be a highly technical determination, but the math of sta-
tistical correlation and actuarial relevance is not an exact science—it
is not blind, and it is certainly not guaranteed to be fair.23 Instead, the
21. See FED. INS. OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, HOW TO MODERNIZE AND IM-
PROVE THE SYSTEM OF INSURANCE REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 56 (2013)
[hereinafter FIO Report] (using the example of “insurance scores” to illustrate
the increasing amount of data available to insurers); infra section VI.C.
22. Joel Laucher, Big Data Working Group Public Hearing, NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMMIS-
SIONERS (Apr. 3, 2016), http://www.naic.org/audio/committees_d_big_data_wg_16
0403_4.mp3.
23. See Thomas A. Moultrie & R. Guy Thomas, The Right to Underwrite? An Actua-
rial Perspective with a Difference, 5 J. ACTUARIAL PRAC. 125, 134 (1997) (noting
some of the subjective decisions made by actuaries within the “scientific” process
630 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96:624
underlying assumptions, evidence, and inputs that go into actuarial
calculations affect the outcome. Genetic tests that lack predictive pre-
cision may be useful for parents weighing subjective risks or patients
considering alternative treatments, but they are generally not eco-
nomically feasible for use in insurance risk classification. A rational
discrimination approach has the potential to level the playing field
across insurance companies nationally, enhance the economic effi-
ciency of the insurance system, increase public understanding and
trust in insurance risk classification, and dampen fears of genetic dis-
crimination. Therefore, it is a necessary baseline policy for countries
grappling with insurer use of genetic-test results.
II. THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS AND FOUNDATIONS
OF INSURANCE REGULATION
Insurance risk classification rests on the theoretical foundation of
actuarial fairness. Actuarial fairness commands equal risks be treated
equally and unequal risks be treated unequally.24 When pricing is ac-
tuarially fair, individuals with lower risks of harm are not unfairly
subsidizing those at higher risk. As the quintessential example holds,
it is unfair for nonsmokers to pay the same premiums as smokers for a
life insurance policy since smokers are more likely to pass away
within the policy term. The insurance industry and state laws often
refer to actuarial fairness as “fair discrimination.”25 Fair discrimina-
tion is a neutral term that refers to the act of differentiating between
unequal risks.26 Thus, in the insurance industry, unfair discrimina-
tion occurs if an insurer makes an insurance decision without actua-
rial justification. Therefore, if insurers have statistical evidence to
of underwriting); see also Deborah A. Stone, The Struggle for the Soul of Health
Insurance, 18 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 287, 296–300 (1993) (noting how, histor-
ically, social stereotypes have appeared in insurance rating manuals alongside
empirical evidence); id. at 299 (“Insurance underwriting, far from being a dry
statistical exercise, is a political exercise in drawing the boundaries of community
membership.”).
24. See RISK CLASSIFICATION WORK GRP., AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES, ON RISK CLASSIFI-
CATION 61 (2011) [hereinafter ON RISK CLASSIFICATION], http://www.actuary.org/
pdf/finreport/RCWG_RiskMonograph_Nov2011.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/5Q4B-
GDFM] (“[E]quality of treatment may be denied as much by requiring apparently
identical benefits be provided to persons unequally situated as by requiring differ-
ent benefits to be provided to persons equally situated.” (quoting 1973 Wash. Op.
Att’y Gen. No. 21)).
25. Leah Wortham, Insurance Classification: Too Important to Be Left to the Actua-
ries, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 349, 361 (1985); see Eric Mills Holmes, Solving the
Insurance/Genetic Fair/Unfair Discrimination Dilemma in Light of the Human
Genome Project, 85 KY. L.J. 503, 549 (1996); John V. Jacobi, Genetic Discriminia-
tion in a Time of False Hopes, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 363, 374 (2002). Similar
principles also applied in the context of health insurance prior to the Affordable
Care Act. See, e.g., Stone, supra note 23, at 292–93.
26. Wortham, supra note 25, at 361.
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substantiate charging a set premium for an associated risk, they
should do so to maintain fairness.
As a first step to prove actuarial justification, insurers must deter-
mine how risky a particular characteristic is; they must have evidence
of a statistical correlation between a risk characteristic—such as
smoking status, body mass index (BMI), or a genetic test result—and
expected loss. There are two aspects of this statistical evidence. First,
the Actuarial Standards Board, a group that defines standards of
practice for the actuarial profession states, “The actuary should select
risk characteristics that are related to expected outcomes. A relation-
ship between a risk characteristic and an expected outcome, such as
cost, is demonstrated if it can be shown that the variation in actual or
reasonably anticipated experience correlates to the risk characteris-
tic.”27 Therefore, there must be a statistical correlation between the
risk characteristic, such as BMI, and the expected outcome, such as
death. Second, an insurer should show a statistical difference between
expected losses across groups to prove risks are unequal and may be
assigned different premium rates.28 “Rates within a risk classification
system would be considered equitable if differences in rates reflect
material differences in expected cost for risk characteristics.”29 For ex-
ample, insurers must show a statistical difference between expected
outcomes of smokers and nonsmokers in order to charge the two
groups different premium amounts.
Fair discrimination is a concept quite distinct from social notions of
unfair discrimination, referred to here as antidiscrimination. While
treating unequal risks unequally is the underpinning of fair discrimi-
nation, antidiscrimination is based upon principles of solidarity.30 The
27. ACTUARIAL STANDARD OF PRACTICE NO. 12 § 3.2.1 (ACTUARIAL STANDARDS BD.
2005), http://www.actuarialstandardsboard.org/pdf/asops/asop012_101.pdf
[https://perma.unl.edu/EVA2-EPXR].
28. See Wortham, supra note 25, at 372 (generally describing the requirements and
noting the requirement that risk characteristics “reasonably reflect differences in
loss experience and that the data be credible” (quoting U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, ISSUES AND NEEDED IMPROVEMENTS IN STATE REGULATION OF THE INSUR-
ANCE BUSINESS 127 (1979)).
29. ACTUARIAL STANDARD OF PRACTICE NO. 12 § 3.2.1 (ACTUARIAL STANDARDS BD.
2005), http://www.actuarialstandardsboard.org/pdf/asops/asop012_101.pdf
[https://perma.unl.edu/EVA2-EPXR] (noting that “equitable” and “fair” can be
used interchangeably for this principle).
30. See, e.g., Regina Austin, The Insurance Classification Controversy, 131 U. PA. L.
REV. 517 (1983); C.D. Daykin et al., Genetics and Insurance—Some Social Policy
Issues, 9 BRIT. ACTUARIAL J. 787 (2003); Jyri Liukko, Genetic Discrimination, In-
surance, and Solidarity: An Analysis of the Argumentation for Fair Risk Classifi-
cation, NEW GENETICS & SOC’Y 457, 467–69 (2010) (referring to this form of
solidarity specifically as “subsidizing risk solidarity,” in contrast to “chance soli-
darity”); Stone, supra note 23; Ine Van Hoyweghen & Lisa Rebert, Your Genes in
Insurance: From Genetic Discrimination to Genomic Solidarity, 9 PERSONALIZED
MED. 871 (2012).
632 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96:624
solidarity view holds that insurance is a mechanism of distributive
justice and mutual aid whereby individuals come together to increase
access to social goods and economic security through redistribution
from the lucky to the unlucky—from those who pay insurance premi-
ums, but never face a loss, to those who experience sickness, death, or
other insured harm and must file claims.31 Under this framework,
some risk factors are seen as inappropriate to use in the insurance
decision-making process no matter how statistically accurate they are
in informing risk classification.32 These traits range from commonly
protected traits such as gender, race, and religion to more specific
traits such as human-immunodeficiency-virus (HIV) status or history
of intimate-partner violence.33 Although insurance companies are not
barred from using these traits in all states or across all lines of insur-
ance, legislatures turn to this option when they feel values of social
fairness override any business considerations.34
While insurers could employ countless potential risk characteris-
tics in their risk classification systems beyond those specifically
banned due to social fairness, in the United States, state law estab-
lishes the bounds of fair use of these remaining possibilities.35 All fifty
states have some form of fair discrimination, actuarial fairness, or ac-
tuarial justification statutes, with many employing standardized lan-
guage from model law.36 For example, one such model law, developed
31. See Stone, supra note 23, at 290. See generally INE VAN HOYWEGHEN, RISKS IN THE
MAKING: TRAVELS IN LIFE INSURANCE AND GENETICS (Amsterdam Univ. Press
2007) (2006); Holmes, supra note 25, at 563 (describing the social concepts of fair-
ness as “fair redistribution” in contrast to the use of “fair discrimination” from
the language of insurance); Liukko, supra note 30; Moultrie & Thomas, supra
note 23, at 129 (noting social fairness focuses on equality of outcome in contrast
to actuarial fairness that focuses on equality of assessment).
32. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND
PUBLIC POLICY 66 (1986) [hereinafter DISTRIBUTING RISK] (identifying concerns of
social or moral connotations, among other values, as “sacrifices in risk-distribu-
tional fairness”). See generally Ronen Avraham et al., Understanding Insurance
Anti-Discrimination Laws, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 195 (2014) [hereinafter Under-
standing Insurance] (analyzing state insurance-antidiscrimination laws in re-
gards to race, national origin, religion, gender, age, credit score, genetics, sexual
orientation, and zip code).
33. DISTRIBUTING RISK, supra note 32, at 66 (identifying concerns of social or moral
connotations, among other values, as “sacrifices in risk-distributional fairness”);
Tom Baker, Containing the Promise of Insurance: Adverse Selection and Risk
Classification, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 371, 392 (2002).
34. See generally Understanding Insurance, supra note 32, for a comprehensive as-
sessment of which characteristics are barred under which lines of insurance in
which states.
35. See infra section IV.C for a discussion of the actuarial considerations insurers
take into account when choosing risk characteristics within the bounds of fair
use.
36. UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES ACT (UTPA) § 4(G) (NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMM’RS 2004).
For examples of state versions of the UTPA, see ALA. CODE § 27-12-11(a) (1971);
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by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), bars
insurers from “making or permitting any unfair discrimination be-
tween individuals of the same class and equal expectation of life in the
rates charged for any life insurance policy or annuity or in the divi-
dends or other benefits payable thereon, or in any other of the terms
and conditions of such policy.”37 Every state imposes these require-
ments on life insurers, and many have also extended similar require-
ments to long-term care and disability insurers.38
One of the most salient aspects of the history of fair discrimination
statutes is they were created as an effort to avoid federal regulation of
the insurance industry.39 Couched as unfair trade practices, these
laws originally enshrined actuarial principles and risk classification
as status quo. State regulation since the McCarran–Ferguson Act has
been largely deferential to the insurance industry and varies greatly
among states.40 Although states have the power to regulate pricing
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-448(A) (2009); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-446 (1996);
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 500.2019 (1957); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:29B-4(7) (West 2001);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 58-33-12 (1978); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-508 (2014); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 26-13-109(a) (1983); see also UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-23a-402(3)(a)
(West 2017) (allowing differentiation only on “the basis of classifications related
to the nature and the degree of the risk covered or the expenses involved”); WIS.
STAT. § 628.34(3) (2012) (same).
37. UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES ACT (UTPA) § 4(G) (NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMM’RS 2004).
38. See MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 18-120 (West 2008); LONG-TERM CARE INSURANCE
MODEL REGULATION (NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMM’RS 2017); Rothstein, supra note 5, at
63.
39. The pervasiveness of state fair discrimination statutes and the development of
the model law stem from the federalist history of insurance regulation. In the
1800s, an ongoing tension simmered regarding whether insurance regulation
should occur at the state or federal level. In 1868, the Supreme Court held insur-
ance was not a transaction of commerce and therefore was left to the jurisdiction
of the states. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (1 Wall.) 168 (1868). However, in 1944 the
Court overturned this decision, United States v. S.-E. Underwriters Ass’n, 322
U.S. 533 (1944), causing confusion and a lack of regulatory oversight. Congress
settled this debate in favor of state oversight through the McCarran–Ferguson
Insurance Regulation Act (McCarran–Ferguson Act) of 1945, ch. 20, 59 Stat. 33
(1945) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 (2012)), albeit allowing for
future federal regulation of the business of insurance. The McCarran–Ferguson
Act cautioned that if states did not regulate insurance, the industry would be
subject to federal antitrust and unfair trade practice acts. Id. In order to avoid
federal sanction, the insurance industry and the states scrambled to establish
sufficient state oversight of the business of insurance. Holmes, supra note 25, at
548–50. The NAIC, a private association of state insurance commissioners seek-
ing to create uniform regulation of insurance across states, played a major role in
this process. Id. Shortly after Congress passed the McCarran–Ferguson Act,
NAIC and industry partners formulated one of the first post-McCarran model
laws, the Unfair Trade Practices Act (UTPA), which includes provisions regard-
ing fair discrimination. UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES  ACT (UTPA) § 4(G) (NAT’L
ASS’N INS. COMM’RS 2004).
40. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., PAD-79-72, ISSUES AND NEEDED IMPROVE-
MENTS IN STATE REGULATION OF THE INSURANCE BUSINESS (1979) [hereinafter
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and risk classification systems of insurance companies, there is varia-
bility in how thoroughly and adequately they oversee and protect
against unfair trade practices.41 Resource pressures also affect states’
abilities to oversee all aspects of the market. It is questionable
whether state insurance regulators initiate detailed investigations
into the actuarial sufficiency of each risk characteristic and whether
they would currently have sufficient resources to undertake this even
if they so desired.42
III. POLICY APPROACHES
The debate over insurer use of genetic test results falls squarely
into the dialogue regarding fair discrimination or antidiscrimination.
Genetic testing involves the sequencing of an individual’s genes to
look for changes, called “variants,” that are associated with increased
risk of disease.43 This predictive risk information can stem from many
different types of tests, such as genetic tests that look at only one
gene, a panel of genes, or sequencing that may unearth findings in any
number of genes.44 Here, it can be helpful to distinguish between ge-
netics, which identifies changes, or variants, within one single gene
and examines how these contribute to health and disease, and ge-
nomics, which investigates the entire genetic makeup and considers
GAO Report], https://www.gao.gov/assets/130/127863.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/
P2RS-WMUB]. See generally FIO Report, supra note 21, at 46 (historically, this
has been an ongoing concern.).
41. FIO Report, supra note 21, at 46.
42. See GAO Report, supra note 40; Leah Wortham, The Economics of Insurance
Classification: The Sound of One Invisible Hand Clapping, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 835
(1986).
43. There are many different types of testing and a range of information that can
arise from such testing and sequencing. See infra section V.A. This description
sets a cursory baseline understanding, which will be further extrapolated. See
infra section V.A. One particular testing distinction of importance is that be-
tween diagnostic and predictive genetic testing. In the first, genetic testing is
used to assist in the diagnosis or treatment of existing symptoms, such as tumor
testing for cancer. E.g., ASS’N OF BRITISH INSURERS, CONCORDAT AND MORATORIUM
ON GENETICS AND INSURANCE 12 (2014), https://www.abi.org.uk/globalassets/
sitecore/files/documents/publications/public/2014/genetics/concordat-and-morato-
rium-on-genetics-and-insurance.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/BYR4-7S7C]. In the
latter, genetic testing is performed in asymptomatic individuals in order to assess
their risk of developing disease in the future. Id. It is this type of predictive test-
ing discussed in this Article. The line between these two types of testing is not
always clear. Despite grey area, predictive testing is a helpful lens through which
to assess insurer use of genetic testing and one that is often used. See infra sub-
section III.C.1. (discussing the insurer moratorium on the use of genetic test re-
sults in the UK).
44. See generally PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, PRI-
VACY AND PROGRESS IN WHOLE GENOME SEQUENCING (2012) [hereinafter PRIVACY
AND PROGRESS], http://bioethics.gov/sites/default/files/PrivacyProgress508.pdf
[https://perma.unl.edu/Z6R9-8TF2] (discussing various types of genetic testing).
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how genes interact with each other, the environment, and lifestyle.45
Early genetic research and the Human Genome Project focused on un-
derstanding the basic biology of genes and establishing how single
genes were associated with disease.46 Today, research is increasingly
focused on the genome and assessing gene and environment interac-
tions through projects like the Precision Medicine Initiative (PMI),
now called the All of Us Research Program.47 These projects are amas-
sing significantly more information and data and are unearthing more
complex links between genetic variation, environmental impacts, and
disease. The nuances and complications of this will be discussed at
greater length below.48  Suffice it to say, from this basic perspective, it
is clear why genetic test results are intriguing and attractive to insur-
ers—during risk classification, insurers are calculating an individ-
ual’s likelihood to get sick or pass away; thus, information linked to
propensity for disease would be highly relevant.
A. Prohibitive Approach
Despite this basic premise, several points are consistently raised to
argue insurers should be banned from considering any genetic test re-
sult.49 First, there is an unfortunate history of stigmatization against
45. Frequently Asked Questions About Genetic and Genomic Science, NAT’L HUM.
GENOME RES. INST., https://www.genome.gov/19016904/faq-about-genetic-and-ge-
nomic-science/#al-1 [https://perma.unl.edu/TB2P-FDCP] (last updated Mar. 2,
2016).
46. The Human Genome Project (HGP) was a thirteen-year international project that
successfully mapped the human genome for the first time. See Francis S. Collins
& Victor A. McKusick, Implications of the Human Genome Project for Medical
Science, 285 JAMA 540, 541 (2001). Ever since completion of the HGP in 2003,
researchers, physicians, and the media have heralded the promise of genomics to
revolutionize medicine and our understanding of treatment and risk for disease.
See Eric D. Green et al., Charting a Course for Genomic Medicine from Base Pairs
to Bedside, 470 NATURE 204 (2011); Alan E. Guttmacher & Francis S. Collins,
Realizing the Promise of Genomics in Biomedical Research, 294 JAMA 1399
(2005).
47. The PMI is a $215 million federal project designed to harness big data through
electronic medical records, mobile health technologies, and genomic sequencing.
Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, President Obama’s Precision Medicine
Initiative (Jan. 30, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/
30/fact-sheet-president-obama-s-precision-medicine-initiative [https://perma.unl
.edu/6V4E-FVMU]; President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan.
20, 2015); All of Us Research Program, NAT’L INST. HEALTH, https://allofus.nih
.gov [https://perma.unl.edu/GPV2-E29J] . It plans to recruit one million research
participants in order to develop and discover individualized treatment and pre-
vention for clinical care. Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, supra.
48. See infra section V.A.
49. See Understanding Insurance, supra note 32, at 214–21 (delineating arguments
raised for why genetic information should not be used by insurers, especially sur-
rounding five fairness-related considerations including control and social solidar-
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individuals with certain genetic traits.50 Taken to the extreme, this
stigmatization led to practices of eugenics and forced sterilization in
the United States and abroad.51 Such discriminatory and reprehensi-
ble practices reinforce arguments that genetic information is a trait
that raises civil rights concerns and that harm based on being part of
a stigmatized group despite the immutable nature of one’s genetic
code is unfair and unwarranted in society. Second, genetic tests have
the potential to disclose highly personal information about one’s self
and family, such as a predisposition to a mental illness or an incur-
able, degenerative disease. It is only natural that individuals desire a
right to privacy and feel they should not be required to disclose test
results or have surreptitious testing done without their consent.
In addition to intangible harms, insurer use of genetic test results
may lead to tangible economic and medical harm. For example, indi-
viduals who have genetic predispositions to diseases such as early-on-
set Alzheimer’s Disease or a hereditary cancer syndrome may be more
likely to be denied insurance given their risk for increased morbidity
and mortality.52 Even absent an outright denial, those with higher
risk are more likely to be charged higher premiums or to be offered
insurance policies that do not cover certain conditions. Such insurance
actions risk the creation of a “genetic underclass” of individuals who
will never be able to secure or afford insurance, especially at the mo-
ments that they need it most.53 Tangible harms stemming from ad-
verse insurer decisions based on one’s genetic information has been
labeled “genetic discrimination.”54
Genetic testing can provide guidance relevant for treatment op-
tions and prevention, potentially minimizing the occurrence and bur-
den of disease in society. Yet, evidence showed fear of genetic
discrimination discouraged individuals from undergoing medically
ity, socially suspect classifications, differential inaccuracy, correlation and
causation, and privacy); Gruber, supra note 1; Haidle, supra note 1.
50. See Neil A. Holtzman & Mark A. Rothstein, Eugenics and Genetic Discrimina-
tion, 50 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 457, 457–59 (1992).
51. See id.
52. See Yann Joly et al., Genetic Discrimination and Life Insurance: A Systematic
Review of the Evidence, 11 BMC MED. 1, 11 (2013); Wendy McKinnon et al., Sur-
vey of Unaffected BRCA and Mismatch Repair (MMR) Mutation Positive Individ-
uals, 8 FAMILIAL CANCER 363, 367 (2009).
53. James P. Evans, Health Care in the Age of Genetic Medicine, 10 GENETICS MED. 1,
2 (2008); Krupa Subramanian et al., Estimating Adverse Selection Costs from Ge-
netic Testing for Breast and Ovarian Cancer: The Case of Life Inusrance, 66 J.
RISK & INS. 531, 532 (1999).
54. Larry Gostin, Genetic Discrimination: The Use of Genetically Based Diagnostic
and Prognostic Tests by Employers and Insurers, 17 AM. J.L. & MED. 109, 109–10
(1991).
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recommended testing or participating in research.55 Widespread fear
of genetic discrimination was a primary motivator for GINA’s pas-
sage.56 Congress worried this fear could diminish the potential medi-
cal impact of the technology and adopted a prohibitive approach in the
context of health insurance to encourage broad uptake across soci-
ety.57 Therefore, GINA prohibits covered health insurers and employ-
ers from collecting, asking for, or using a person’s genetic information,
including family medical history, in insurance or employment deci-
sions.58 However, due to compromises in the legislative process, life,
long-term care, and disability insurers were not included.59 Absent
legislation at the federal level, any restrictions on life, long-term care,
and disability insurer use of genetic test results come at the state
level, leaving fair discrimination as the primary regulatory
framework.60
55. E.g., Alicia A. Parkman et al., Public Awareness of Genetic Nondiscrimination
Laws in Four States and Perceived Importance of Life Insurance Protections, 24 J.
GENETIC COUNSELING 512, 512 (2014).
56. E.g., Press Release, Representative Lousie M. Slaughter, Slaughter Testifies in
Support of GINA (Jan. 30, 2007), https://louise.house.gov/media-center/press-re-
leases/january-30-2007-slaughter-testifies-support-gina [https://perma.unl.edu/
6JHQ-F63W].
57. Id.
58. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) of 2008, pmbl., Pub. L. No.
110-233, 122 Stat. 881 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42
U.S.C) (noting potential avoidance of genetic testing as a reason for passing
legislation).
59. Robert C. Green et al., GINA, Genetic Discrimination, and Genomic Medicine,
372 NEW ENG. J. MED. 397, 397 (2015).
60. Some states also have laws that regulate how insurance companies can use ge-
netic test results, but the statutes generally do not ban the use overall. For exam-
ple, some states require insurers to obtain informed consent prior to undertaking
genetic testing on an individual’s sample. CAL. INS. CODE § 10148(a) (West 1998);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1202(a) (West 2012); ME. STAT. tit. 24-a, § 2159-
C(2)(B)(2)(a) (1990); OR. REV. STAT. § 746.135(1) (1991). Other statutes prohibit
insurers from requiring an applicant to take a genetic test. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-
2259 (2010); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 175, § 108I (2006); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§ 9334(a)(1) (1997). In states with these types of statutes, as long as consent is
received or an insurer does not require genetic testing, they can use genetic test
results within the bounds of fair use and fair discrimination. Three states are
commonly cited as having stronger protections that limit life, long-term care, and
disability insurers from using genetic test results—California, Oregon, and Ver-
mont. See Klitzman et al., supra note 1; Peikoff, supra note 1. However, it is
unclear whether these statutes offer protections as extensive as cited in the liter-
ature and popular press. For example, California previously had a statute that
prevented long-term care insurers from using genetic test results, but it had a
sunset provision that expired. CAL. INS. CODE § 10233.1 (West 2003) (expired
Jan. 1, 2008). More recently, the California legislature passed Cal-GINA that ad-
ded genetic information to the state civil rights act. Unruh Civil Rights Act, CAL.
CIV. CODE § 51 (West 2016). However, although the civil rights act arguably ap-
plies to insurance, see CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.03 (West 2016), case law regarding a
life insurance applicant’s disability holds that pricing differentials do not violate
638 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96:624
Internationally, most notably in Europe, countries have restricted
insurer use of genetic test results beyond just health insurance
through legislative bans. For example, Austria, France, and Sweden
all bar life insurers from using genetic test results in risk classifica-
tion.61 These laws place genetic test results squarely in the realm of
social fairness, recognizing that societal concerns override the eco-
nomic and actuarial arguments of the insurance companies.
B. Status Quo Approach
On the other side of the debate, there are also strong arguments for
why insurers should be allowed to use information from genetic test
results in risk classification. Indeed, insurer nonuse of genetic test re-
sults can lead to several tangible harms. First, the inability to prop-
erly classify risk may lead to adverse selection and spiraling insurance
costs. Adverse selection is the incidence, and its sequelae, where indi-
the act as long as they are actuarially justified. Chabner v. United of Omaha Life
Ins. Co., 225 F.3d 1042, 1050 (9th Cir. 2000). It remains to be seen whether Cal-
GINA will be interpreted to ban all pricing differentials or only those without
actuarial justification. Vermont law prohibits covered insurance to be “under-
written or conditioned on the basis of . . . the results of genetic testing of a mem-
ber of the individual’s family.” VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 9334(a)(2) (1997). The law
does not speak to the results of the genetic testing of the individual themselves.
Id. Oregon law states that “[a] person may not use genetic information about a
blood relative to reject, deny, limit, cancel, refuse to renew, increase the rates of,
affect the terms and conditions of or otherwise affect any policy of insurance.” OR.
REV. STAT. § 746.135(4) (2001). The statutory language includes “blood relative,”
indicating that, similar to Vermont law, it is intended to prohibit only the use of a
family member’s genetic test. However, genetic information is defined as “infor-
mation about an individual or the individual’s blood relatives obtained from a
genetic test.” OR. REV. STAT. § 192.531(11) (2007). This allows for a circular statu-
tory interpretation whereby the genetic information of a blood relative includes
one’s own genetic test results—an interpretation that may be suspect given that
this would make the inclusion of blood relative superfluous in the statute. To
further complicate the situation, three states have limitations on underwriting on
the basis of genetic test results that are not often cited in the literature: Colorado
in connection to group-disability and long-term care insurers, COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 10-3-1104.7(3)(b) (2009), Arizona related to unmanifested conditions in disabil-
ity and long-term care, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-448(F) (2009), and Kansas in
connection with disability and long-term care. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-2259(d)
(2010); see also DRAFT UNIFORM PROTECTION OF GENETIC INFORMATION IN EMPLOY-
MENT AND INSURANCE ACT (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. LAWS 2010).
Overall, it is beyond the scope of this Article to settle the question of the extent to
which these states truly ban life, long-term care, or disability insurer use of ge-
netic test results—for all six states it appears that the statutes have not been
extensively discussed nor tested in court; therefore, it is unclear how they will be
interpreted in practice. However, even if they do ban such use, the majority of the
states remain within a fair discrimination framework.
61. Joly et al., supra note 6, at 362.
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viduals hold information about their risk not known to insurers.62 If
adverse selection materializes, there may be a greater proportion of
high-risk individuals in the risk class than the insurer originally an-
ticipated and likely greater claims expenses.63 To pay for these unex-
pected claims, the insurers must increase the premiums of the class,
potentially causing more low-risk individuals to decline insurance,
which would perpetuate a spiraling pattern of increasing premiums
and departure of low-risk individuals from the insurance pool.64
Adverse selection has the potential to impact a larger portion of the
population than use of genetic test results. While charging individuals
higher premiums based on genetic risk would likely affect the small
segment of the population at high risk of genetic conditions, adverse
selection and increased premiums could potentially harm individuals
across the entire population.
[There is a] danger that by concentrating just on “unfairness” on the basis of
genetics and worrying about a “genetic underclass”, [sic] [policies] will end up
discriminating against the rest of the population, or force insurers to with-
draw some insurance products. This could create a much larger “financial un-
derclass” (of which the “genetic underclass” would be a subset) as premiums
could increase beyond the reach of many more people.65
62. See Ronen Avraham, The Economics of Insurance Law—A Primer, 19 CONN. INS.
L.J. 29, 45 (2012) [hereinafter The Economics of Insurance Law] (noting that risk
classification is a tool to mitigate the threat of adverse selection); Understanding
Insurance, supra note 32; Baker, supra note 33.
63. E.g., NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, REPORT OF THE NAIC GENETIC TESTING WORK-
ING GROUP 6–7 (1996) [hereinafter GENETIC TESTING WORKING GROUP REPORT],
http://www.naic.org/store/free/GTR-OP.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/CZA4-6G8N];
Baker, supra note 33, at 375 (defining adverse selection as “the theoretical ten-
dency for low risk individuals to avoid or drop out of voluntary insurance pools,
with the result that, absent countervailing efforts by administrators, insurance
pools can be expected to contain a disproportionate percentage of high-risk indi-
viduals”). But see Ronen Avraham et al., Towards a Universal Framework for
Insurance Anti-Discrimination Laws, 21 CONN. INS. L.J. 1, 10–14 (2014) (finding
that the risk of adverse selection based on the percentage of high-risk individuals
in the potential pool, expected cost, the elasticity of demand, the presence of sec-
ondary markets and penalties for leaving policies, extent of consumer knowledge,
and whether overinsurance is possible or whether insurance policies are
mandatory); Alma Cohen & Peter Siegelman, Testing for Adverse Selection in In-
surance Markets, 77 J. RISK & INS. 39 (2010) (the extent to which adverse selec-
tion is actually a threat to insurance systems is dependent on many factors
including the insurance market and insurance line).
64. E.g., Understanding Insurance, supra note 32, at 204 n.28; Krupa S. Vis-
wanathan et al., Adverse Selection in Term Life Insurance Purchasing Due to the
BRCA1/2 Genetic Test and Elastic Demand, 74 J. RISK & INS. 65, 66 (2007). But
see Peter Siegelman, Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated
Threat, 113 YALE L.J. 1223, 1254–58 (2004) (finding that the threat of death spi-
rals in insurance is unusual).
65. U.K. DEP’T OF HEALTH, SECOND REPORT FROM SEPTEMBER 2002 TO DECEMBER
2003, at 1, 65 (2004) [hereinafter GAIC SECOND REPORT], http://www.dh.gov.uk/
en/Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/AnnualReports/DH_4070357?ssSource
SiteId=ab [https://perma.unl.edu/9WH7-UWFS].
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Overall increased premiums or, at the extreme, failure of the insur-
ance company or system, are obviously harms to everyone in society.
Thus, the extent to which adverse selection will affect premiums and
individuals’ propensities to enter and exit the market greatly affects
the extent of harm due to nonuse of genetic test results.66
Second, any limits on insurer use of a risk characteristic introduce
actuarial unfairness into the system. If actuarial data indicates indi-
viduals with a specific genetic variant are at greater risk for disease, it
would be arguably unfair for those without the variant to pay the
same premiums as those with the variant.67 Lower risk individuals
are thus financially disadvantaged if insurers fail to take into account
their genetic risk. Based on these principles, some states have fair dis-
crimination laws that specifically reference genetic information,68 ge-
netic conditions,69 or genetic test results.70 However, these laws may
not provide any further protection beyond the general fair discrimina-
tion requirements because the general statutes are likely sufficiently
broad to encompass genetic test results.71
The statutes do illustrate the range of language and evidence
states use to legislate in this area. For example, Maryland law allows
long-term care insurers to use genetic information in coverage and
rating decisions if based on sound actuarial principles.72 Similarly,
Massachusetts law prohibits unfair discrimination by allowing use of
genetic test results only when “such action is taken pursuant to relia-
ble information relating to the insured’s mortality or morbidity, based
66. See Avraham et al., supra note 63, at 10–12 (noting a similar trend across insur-
ance lines and protective traits, and listing eight factors that affect the risk of
adverse selection, including the percentage of high-risk individuals, the differ-
ence in expected costs, whether policies are mandatory, the elasticity of demand,
the ability of individuals to overinsure, the availability of a secondary market,
the ability of policyholders and insurers to cancel policies, and the transparency
of the policy design); Robert C. Green et al., GINA, Genetic Discrimination, and
Genomic Medicine, 372 NEW ENG. J. MED. 397, 398–99 (2015). Many scholars
argue adverse selection is not as great a concern as is often portrayed. Baker,
supra note 33; Angus Macdonald & Fei Yu, The Impact of Genetic Information on
the Insurance Industry: Conclusions from the “Bottom-Up” Modelling Pro-
gramme, 41 ASTIN BULL. 343 (2011) (finding adverse selection specific to genetic
information is unlikely to greatly affect the insurance market); Siegelman, supra
note 64; R. Guy Thomas, Some Novel Perspectives on Risk Classification, 32 GE-
NEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. ISSUES & PRAC. 105, 129 (2007).
67. AM. COUNCIL OF LIFE INS., THE POTENTIAL ROLE OF GENETIC TESTING IN RISK
CLASSIFICATION 10 (1989).
68. ME. STAT. tit. 24, § 2159-C(3) (2009). Genetic information is defined as “the infor-
mation concerning genes, gene products or inherited characteristics that may be
obtained from an individual or family member.” § 2159-C(1)(B).
69. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-448(E) (2009). Genetic condition is defined as “a spe-
cific chromosomal or single-gene genetic condition.” § 20-448(L)(5).
70. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-2259(d)(2) (2010).
71. Rothstein, supra note 5, at 63.
72. MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 18-120 (West 2008).
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on sound actuarial principles or actual or reasonably anticipated claim
experience.”73 Under Montana law, life and disability insurers are
similarly allowed to use evidence from either actuarial projections or
claims experience to “establish that substantial differences in claims
are likely to result from the genetic condition.”74 In the Montana law,
however, genetic conditions are limited to chromosomal or single-gene
conditions.75 As a final example, Wisconsin law restricts life and disa-
bility insurers from using genetic information that is “not reasonably
related to the risk involved.”76 Overall, the potentially duplicative
state laws specific to genetics highlight tensions between the desire
for legislative action in the this area and the entrenched principles of
fair discrimination as the regulatory framework in the insurance
industry.
Internationally, countries that follow a status quo approach in-
clude South Africa and New Zealand.77 Prior to 2017, Canada had a
status quo approach until Parliament passed a bill that prohibits in-
surers, including life insurers, from using genetic test results.78 The
bill is currently undergoing judicial review to determine the constitu-
tionality of the legislation and may eventually be reviewed by the Su-
preme Court of Canada.79
C. Rational Discrimination Approach
Although social and actuarial fairness seem squarely at odds, sev-
eral policy recommendations provide insight into a middle ground be-
tween the two positions.80 Under the framework proposed by these
policies, insurers are allowed to use genetic test results that meet sci-
entific, clinical, and actuarial standards. The label employed by Joly of
rational discrimination mirrors the insurance industry concepts of
fair and unfair discrimination.81 It would be irrational for insurers to
use a risk characteristic that has no actuarial relevance; thus, the ra-
73. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 175, § 120E (2006).
74. MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-18-206(4) (2017).
75. § 33-18-206(5c).
76. WIS. STAT. § 631.89 (2009).
77. Joly et al., supra note 6, at 352.
78. Genetic Non-Discrimination Act, S.C. 2017, c 3 (Can.).
79. Press Release, Quebec Court of Appeal, Reference to the Court of Appeal of Que-
bec Concerning the Genetic Non-Discrimination Act Enacted by Sections 1 to 7 of
the Act to Prohibit and Prevent Genetic Discrimination (July 7, 2017), http://cour
dappelduquebec.ca/fileadmin/Fichiers_client/Actualites/SANS_SIGNATURE_-_
Press_release_-_Reference_-_Genetic_Non-Dis.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/3ASM-
CAGH]; Victoria Gibson, Genetic Testing Back on Radar for Parents, STAR (Aug.
9, 2017), https://www.thestar.com/news/gta/2017/08/09/genetic-testing-back-on-
radar-for-parents.html [https://perma.unl.edu/4R6G-3AJV].
80. See Joly et al., supra note 6, at 356 (labeling this policy mechanism the “rational
discrimination approach”).
81. See supra Part II.
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tional discrimination approach limits insurer use to risk characteris-
tics that have actuarial justification. In other words, insurers are only
allowed to practice fair discrimination, not unfair discrimination.
So far, this approach appears to be the same as the status quo at
the state level. The distinction, however, is the rational discrimination
approach adds an additional requirement of transparency or oversight
to the system. Under the Joly conception, the rational discrimination
approach accepts the premise that it is important for insurers to have
access to and the ability to utilize actuarially relevant information but
removes the final determination of what constitutes sufficient actua-
rial evidence from the insurance industry itself.82 Independent review
adds some social fairness concerns back into the actuarial picture by
ensuring that information used by insurers is scientifically valid and
supported by actuarial evidence. This policy mechanism does not ad-
dress all societal concerns regarding fairness since insurers would still
be allowed to deny insurance or charge higher premiums for individu-
als with genetic test results that meet actuarial standards. Thus, it
targets only irrational discrimination or misuse of genetic test results
rather than broadly prohibiting all discrimination.83
Three policies based in varying degrees upon this mechanism, one
implemented in the United Kingdom and two proposed in the United
States and Australia, are presented below. They raise a myriad of
questions, such as whether independent review of genetic test results
is needed when this is not required of insurers for other types of medi-
cal information, why the United States and Australian examples were
never fully implemented, and what standards such independent bod-
ies would use to find actuarial relevance. After a brief presentation of
the three policies, the remainder of the Article will examine these nor-
mative questions regarding whether the rational discrimination ap-
proach is sound policy and whether it should be recommended and
implemented in the future.
1. United Kingdom Moratorium and Concordat
The United Kingdom has one of the longest standing policies regu-
lating insurer use of genetic test results. Since 2001, the Association of
British Insurers (ABI) has voluntarily agreed to a moratorium on the
use of most predictive genetic test results.84 This moratorium is sup-
ported by a Concordat between the government and the ABI.85 The
Concordat sets out the terms of cooperation between the government
82. See Joly et al., supra note 6, at 356.
83. Id. See infra sections VI.D and VIII.A for further discussion.
84. The U.K. moratorium is specifically narrowed to predictive genetic test results
and does not consider the diagnostic testing. ASS’N OF BRITISH INSURERS, supra
note 43, at 1.
85. Id.
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and ABI to ensure that “insurers’ use of genetic information is trans-
parent, fair and subject to regular reviews.”86 Under the agreement
and moratorium, insurers will not require disclosure of predictive ge-
netic test results up to specific policy limits.87 Thus, for policies under
the set limits, insurers agreed to a prohibitive ban on the use of all
predictive genetic test results. These limits are set for life insurance
(£500,000), critical illness (£300,000), and income protection (£30,000
annually). For policies with amounts greater than the agreed limits,
insurers can collect and use the results of those predictive genetic
tests that have been approved by an established governmental body,
the Genetics and Insurance Committee (GAIC).88 To date, GAIC has
only approved the use of a genetic test for Huntington’s Disease in life
insurance applications over £500,000.89 Although more applications
were initially submitted to the GAIC, after procedure clarification, no
new applications have been submitted in over a decade.90
2. Australian Guidance
In 2003, the Australian Law Reform Commission and the Austra-
lian Health Ethics Committee (AHEC) of the National Health and
Medical Research Council undertook an extensive analysis regarding
protection of genetic test results across many sectors of society.91 In
their analysis of insurance, they focused on standards of actuarial jus-
tification.92 The Australia Disability Discrimination Act bans discrim-
ination on the basis of a disability but has an exception for insurers as
long as any differentiation is “based upon actuarial or statistical data”
or “in a case where no such actuarial or statistical data is available
and cannot reasonably be obtained—the discrimination is reasonable
having regard to any other relevant factors.”93 After inquiry and re-
view, the working group determined there was no present need to al-
ter the fundamental principles of the insurance market and impose
any bans on insurer use of genetic test results.94 Therefore, the work-
ing group opted towards a status quo approach to insurer use of ge-
netic test results.
86. Id. at 1.
87. Id. at 7.
88. Id.
89. GAIC SECOND REPORT, supra note 65, at 7.
90. See infra section VII.B.
91. AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N &  AUSTRALIAN HEALTH ETHICS COMM., ESSEN-
TIALLY YOURS: THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN GENETIC INFORMATION IN AUSTRALIA
667–733 (2003) [hereinafter ESSENTIALLY YOURS].
92. Id.
93. Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) s 46(1)(f), (g) (Austl.); ESSENTIALLY
YOURS, supra note 91, at 671–72.
94. ESSENTIALLY YOURS, supra note 91, at 693.
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However, the working group did suggest a number of improve-
ments to insurance risk classification systems.95 Given the complexi-
ties and rapidly developing science behind genetic testing, the
working group ultimately suggested there be independent oversight to
determine which genetic tests are appropriate for insurer use. The
working group believed “independent oversight would help to build
public confidence that genetic test information is being used to dis-
criminate only in the limited circumstances permitted by law and that
insurers’ use of genetic test information is transparent and based on
objective information.”96 Thus, although the working group initially
followed a status quo approach, it proposed implementation of a ra-
tional discrimination approach. Following the recommendations, the
government established the Australian Human Genetics Commission
to examine issues related to genetics and insurance, among other
roles, although it has since been disbanded without implementing the
independent review.97
3. U.S. Uniform Law Commission Proposal
In 2010, the Uniform Law Commission developed a draft document
titled the “Uniform Protection of Genetic Information in Employment
and Insurance Act.”98 While the Commission eventually approved a
modified version of the employment section of this draft, the insurance
section was never adopted and remained only in draft form. Under the
draft language, unless a genetic test meets certain delineated stan-
dards, life, long-term care, and disability insurers are prohibited from
“knowingly obtain[ing] or directly or indirectly inquir[ing] about, re-
questi[ing] or requir[ing] an insured to provide the insured’s genetic
information based on a genetic test.”99 These standards require the
insurer to file with the state commissioner of insurance “the test and
documentation supporting to a reasonable degree of scientific cer-
tainty the test’s analytical validity, clinical validity, and a scientific
association between the test and an increased risk of morbidity and
mortality.”100
95. Id. at 699.
96. Id. at 707.
97. Human Genetics Advisory Committee (HGAC), AUSTRALIAN GOV’T NAT’L HEALTH
& MED. RES. COUNCIL, https://www.nhmrc.gov.au/about/nhmrc-committees/previ-
ous-committees-and-advisory-groups/human-genetics-advisory-committee-hga
[https://perma.unl.edu/HY4X-8SHM] (last updated June 30, 2016).
98. DRAFT UNIFORM PROTECTION OF GENETIC INFORMATION IN EMPLOYMENT AND IN-
SURANCE ACT (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. LAWS 2010).
99. Id. § 304(a). Section 301(7) defines genetic information in the context of life insur-
ance, disability income insurance, and long-term care insurance as “(A) the re-
sults of a genetic test; (B) information based on the genetic test of an individual
or an individual’s family member; or (C) information that an individual or an
individual’s family requested or receieved genetic services.”
100. Id. § 306.
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The Commission’s draft is, therefore, a softer version of the ra-
tional discrimination policy approach because it requires documenta-
tion to be filed with, but not approved by, an independent
organization. This was a calculated decision by the drafting commit-
tee—it notes it considered requiring insurance regulators or geneti-
cists to make a prior finding of scientific evidence before a genetic test
could be used but ultimately left the determinations in the hand of the
insurers:
The approach selected by the Committee requires an insurance company to
identify genetic tests that it plans to use and to file documentation supporting
the validity of the test with the state insurance commissioner. This documen-
tation would then be open to public scrutiny, creating transparency that can
provide a check on a company’s determination.101
IV. RISK CLASSIFICATION AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
The rational discrimination approach to regulating insurer use of
genetic test results has been successful in the United Kingdom, but
the proposals in the United States and Australia were never adopted.
Should such proposals be reexamined or implemented in the United
States or Australia, or was failure to implement the proposals sound
public policy? To answer this question, this Article turns to an in-
depth analysis and understanding of the insurance risk classification
process.102
A. Classifying Risk
A core function of insurance companies is to convert information
about potential applicants, called risk characteristics, into calcula-
tions of the likelihood that a covered event will occur at a specified
time and the potential severity of the event.103 Life insurers gauge the
life expectancy of particular population cohorts.104 Disability and
long-term care insurers evaluate the probability that a subgroup of
individuals will, respectively, become unable to work or develop a dis-
ease or condition that requires extended care.105 In life insurance, the
maximum claim paid is the predetermined benefit amount payable
upon death; the only uncertainty is the individual’s life expectancy. If
death is expected to be imminent, the insurer is less likely to gather
101. Id. (reporter’s notes).
102. The background on risk classification comes predominately from the American
regulatory and professional perspective, although the underlying principles and
practices will be similar in the United Kingdom and Australia.
103. ON RISK CLASSIFICATION, supra note 24, at 71.
104. Id. at 4.
105. AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES, RISK CLASSIFICATION IN VOLUNTARY INDIVIDUAL DISABIL-
ITY INCOME AND LONG-TERM CARE INSURANCE 1, 3 (2001) [hereinafter RISK CLASSI-
FICATION IN DI AND LTC INSURANCE], http://www.actuary.org/pdf/health/issue_
genetic_021601.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/Z4GC-RQE5].
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sufficient premium amounts in the short time, unless the premiums
are exorbitantly high. If applicants’ life expectancies are projected to
be longer, the insurer is more likely to recoup the value of total ex-
pected costs in aggregated premiums.106 Beyond the timing of the
event, disability and long-term care insurers must additionally assess
the potential severity of a claim in order to estimate the potential
claim payout. The severity of these claims depends not only on the
likelihood of the person developing a covered condition or disease but
also on other factors, such as how long the condition is expected to
last, the likelihood of recovery or recurrence, and the extent or nature
of care needed.107
Taken together, insurers leverage information about both timing
and severity of claims to establish risk classes based upon similar
levels of risk.108 Applicants in the same risk class may have quite dif-
ferent reasons for their assessed risk but will nevertheless be grouped
together given their comparable likelihoods of covered events. For ex-
ample, applicants in remission for cancer and those who are obese
may be placed in the same risk class despite the distinct underlying
causes of their increased risk.109
Risk classification is the process of establishing classes for the en-
tire population of insureds.110 The related concept of underwriting is
the process of reviewing an individual’s application and characteris-
tics and placing him or her into a pre-defined risk class.111 Three in-
106. Different types of life insurance policies would affect this balance between premi-
ums and life expectancy. In term life insurance, for example, a policy holder is
only insured for a set period of time, often ten years. Wortham, supra note 42, at
847–48. If applicants’ life expectancies are generally greater than the policy term,
the insurer can charge lower premiums across the group as long as premiums
sufficiently account for the chances that some individuals will die during the
term, despite risk predictions. Id. In contrast, whole life insurance provides cov-
erage for an individual’s life span, which guarantees an eventual payout assum-
ing the policy remains in effect and premiums are paid. Id.
107. See generally RISK CLASSIFICATION IN DI AND LTC INSURANCE, supra note 105, at
6; COMM. ON RISK, AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES, RISK CLASSIFICATION: STATEMENT OF
PRINCIPLES 1 (2014) [hereinafter STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES], http://www.actuari-
alstandardsboard.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/riskclassificationSOP.pdf
[https://perma.unl.edu/AA3Q-8R7G].
108. See ON RISK CLASSIFICATION, supra note 24, at 4, 71; Stone, supra note 23, at 293
(defining risk class as “a group of people with similar probabilities of becoming
sick or, perhaps more accurately, with similar probabilities of generating costs to
a company”).
109. See ON RISK CLASSIFICATION, supra note 24, at 33 (using the example of home-
owners insurance and noting that while different geographic territories will have
different population densitities or proximities to fire departments, they could still
be grouped together based on their overall risk probabilities).
110. See generally id.
111. STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES, supra note 107, at 7 (“Development of an appropriate
risk classification system is done without specific regard to any of the individual
risks to be assumed. It is done a priori and establishes the framework within
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surer determinations, based on risk classification and expected cost,
greatly affect individuals and their policies: decisions regarding
whether to accept or deny an applicant, coverage decisions regarding
the level of benefits included in the policy, and rating decisions re-
garding the premium level of the policy.112 An individual with high
risk may be placed in a risk class with particularly high premiums or
with exclusions for certain conditions, such as a disability insurance
policy that excludes coverage for cancer. For cases with extremely
high expected costs or preexisting conditions, the insurer may deny an
application.113
B. Why Insurers Classify Risks
Risk classification, when done well, bolsters the economic effi-
ciency of the insurance systems by creating incentives and optimal
pricing. First, risk classification encourages individuals to minimize
risk.114 For example, to avoid increased insurance premiums, individ-
uals may adopt safer driving habits minimizing tickets or accidents.
which underwriting can be performed. Underwriting is the process of determin-
ing the acceptability of a risk based on its own merits. In contrast to the assign-
ment of a risk to a class based on general criteria, the underwriting process
involves an evaluation of the individual and possibly unique characteristics of
each risk.”); Kenneth S. Abraham, Efficiency and Fairness in Insurance Risk
Classification, 71 VA. L. REV. 403, 408 (1985) [hereinafter Efficiency and Fair-
ness]. In group policies, such as those offered by employers, individual employees
do not go through extensive underwriting—that is, insurers do not collect infor-
mation about risk characteristics at the individual level. See Susan M. Wolf &
Jeffrey P. Kahn, Genetic Testing and the Future of Disability Insurance: Ethics,
Law & Policy, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 6, 14 (2007). But see AM. COUNCIL OF LIFE
INS., supra note 67, at 12 (noting there are some occasions where individuals in
group policies may go through underwriting). Instead, the insurer bases expected
costs on historical data or broader population estimates. Wolf & Kahn, supra, at
14.
112. Jill Gaulding, Race, Sex, and Genetic Discrimination in Insurance: What’s Fair,
80 CORNELL L. REV. 1646, 1651 (1994); Wortham, supra note 42, at 844–45.
113. Rejection of an application is less likely than an offer of limited coverage or of full
coverage with a high premium. Historically, greater percentages of the popula-
tion were deemed to be uninsurable, but life insurance companies realized that
they could create a market for insuring these so-called substandard risks. Stone,
supra note 23, at 295–96. However, despite increased willingness to insure those
with substandard risk, there still remain some occasions where insurers opt for
an outright denial. AM. COUNCIL OF LIFE INS., supra note 67, at 46 (noting insur-
ers may deny insurance when the anticipated mortality is above five hundred
percent of standard); Stone, supra note 23, at 295–96.
114. Efficiency and Fairness, supra note 111, at 431; Maria O’Brien Hylton, Insurance
Risk Classifications After McGann: Managing Risk Efficiently in the Shadow of
the ADA, 47 BAYLOR L. REV. 59, 94 (1995). The flip side of this argument is the
oft-referenced concern of moral hazard. See Understanding Insurance, supra note
32, at 206–07. Failure of insurers to consider certain risk factors may cause indi-
viduals to take less care of themselves or pay less attention to mitigating their
risk. See id.
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Similarly, a smoker charged more for his or her term life insurance
policy may quit smoking to reduce costs in the next term. Both scena-
rios not only benefit the individuals themselves but also ultimately
save insurers money as lower risks equate to fewer overall claims and
payouts. To motivate risk reduction, individuals must know both why
they were charged increased rates and that future rates could be ad-
justed given changes in behavior.115
Second, risk classification facilitates pricing that is actuarially fair,
where an individual’s premiums are proportional to his or her ex-
pected risks.116 Some level of redistribution and subsidization is in-
herent in any insurance system. Given the statistical nature of
grouping risks, even in risk classes with very similar risks, half the
group members will fall below the average risk and half above.117 Ide-
ally, however, risk classification limits the redistribution to differ-
ences among the group that are unknown, unmeasurable, too costly or
impractical to measure, or based on chance.
Pricing individuals proportional to their risk also minimizes ad-
verse selection. When insurers have incomplete risk information
about an applicant, they will be unable to accurately assess expected
costs and appropriate premiums leading to two events, depending
upon the direction of the disproportionality. Premiums more expen-
sive than the expected cost or loss, as perceived by the applicant, may
lead applicants to forgo insurance. Alternatively, premiums perceived
to be a bargain given expected risk are more likely to induce the
purchase of insurance.
The asymmetry of information inherent to the problem of adverse
selection can stem from both external and internal causes.118 Inter-
nally, adverse selection can arise if insurance companies do not prop-
erly classify risk119 or fail to ask for all relevant information,120
115. Additionally, the original risk classifications have to be accurate and based upon
experience rating. Holmes, supra note 25. Similarly, for moral hazard to be a
risk, the individual must control at least some part of the characteristic and there
must be a causal link between the characteristic and the risk. Understanding
Insurance, supra note 32, at 207.
116. See STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES, supra note 107, at 6.; Holmes, supra note 25, at
539; supra Part II. Absent fairness arguments, others argue efficient pricing is
the only way that insurance will function. See Peter Siegelman, Information &
Equilibrium in Insurance Markets with Big Data, 21 CONN. INS. L.J. 317, 332
n.42 (2014).
117. STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES, supra note 107, at 10 (“The occurrence, timing and
magnitude of an unforeseen event for a specific risk cannot be predicted in ad-
vance. Thus, it is inevitable that not all risks in a class will have identical actua-
rial claim experience. Instead, the individual risk’s claim experience will be
statistically distributed around the average experience for the class.”).
118. See Avraham et al., supra note 63.
119. See ON RISK CLASSIFICATION, supra note 24, at 27 (noting there is risk of adverse
selection if prices do not accurately reflect costs).
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causing pricing that is disproportionate to expected risk. Internal ad-
verse selection is especially hazardous in competitive insurance mar-
kets where lower risk individuals can apply for an insurance policy
with a company that calculates risk differently121 or can opt to go
without insurance.122 Externally, applicants can cause information
asymmetry if they intentionally withhold risk information from insur-
ers.123 Additionally, adverse selection occurs when legislation limits
insurers’ ability to collect or use risk characteristics, such as prohibi-
tions on insurer use of gender or race, or, as relevant here, in the pro-
hibitive approach to genetic test results. Sometimes referred to as
regulatory adverse selection, this legislation externally forces asym-
metric information between insurers and applicants.124
C. Choosing a Risk Characteristic
An individual’s expected cost determines whether an applicant is
accepted, at what premium level, and with what covered benefits. Ex-
pected costs are determined from data on risk classes, which are
grouped by levels of risk depending upon the risk characteristics cho-
sen by insurers.125 There are countless potential risk characteristics,
but insurers choose a limited set when establishing their systems.
Several considerations, including statistical, operational, and social,
assist actuaries with determining which characteristics to employ.126
120. As a contract of good faith, or uberrimae fidei, there is an argument an insurance
applicant has a duty to disclose all relevant information regarding risk to the
insurer. Stipcich v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 277 U.S. 311, 316 (1928). However, there
is legal precedent that insureds do not have a duty to disclose unrequested infor-
mation. Id. at 316–17 (finding that information is immaterial if it is not asked for
on insurance applications); see also Siegelman, supra note 64, at 1261–63 (dis-
cussing times when insurers fail to collect information from applicants). See gen-
erally Anya E.R. Prince, Tantamount to Fraud: Exploring Non-Disclosure of
Genetic Information in Life Insurance Applications as Grounds for Policy Rescis-
sion, 26 HEALTH MATRIX 255 (2016).
121. STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES, supra note 107; Rick Swedloff, Risk Classification’s
Big Data (R)Evolution, 21 CONN. INS. L.J. 339, 345 (2014).
122. Swedloff, supra note 121, at 346; see also Baker, supra note 33, at 380 (noting
that mandating universal insurance would avoid concerns of adverse selection).
123. See ON RISK CLASSIFICATION, supra note 24, at 4.
124. E.g., Avraham et al., supra note 63; Michael Hoy & Michael Ruse, Regulating
Genetic Information in Insurance Markets, 8 RISK MGMT. & INS. REV. 211, 214
(2005).
125. See generally Understanding Insurance, supra note 32.
126. There is no set way of presenting these considerations in the literature. This Arti-
cle chooses three categories—statistical, operational, and social—as overarching
frameworks for the multiple considerations discussed in the literature. See gener-
ally STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES, supra note 107, at 9–15 (discussing considera-
tions in designing risk-classification systems); ON RISK CLASSIFICATION, supra
note 24, at 32–37 (generally discussing factors that go into choosing a risk classi-
fication system); Efficency and Fairness, supra note 111, at 409–20 (discussing
five features of a fair risk-classification system); Robert J. Finger, Risk Classifi-
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1. Statistical Considerations
The process of selecting risk characteristics is not an exact science,
and each risk classification system may be different.127 At the most
basic level, insurers will, quite intuitively, not use information about
an individual that does nothing to help predict risk. “Since not every
observable quality of a risk subject provides information that is suffi-
ciently useful . . . , not every observable quality is a risk characteris-
tic.”128 Instead, insurers employ risk characteristics that promote
actuarially fair pricing. Insurers begin with the baseline ideals that
risk characteristics and their effects on risk should be accurate, relia-
ble, and have predictive stability over time.129 However, there are
many qualities, observable and unobservable, that affect risk but can-
not be accounted for in a risk classification system.130 Thus, com-
pletely accurate risk measurement is a goal that can be approached
but never fully achieved.131
Overall, insurers want to make risk classes as homogeneous as
possible in their risk probabilities and expected cost.132 Calculating
expected costs uses tools of actuarial science that are based upon sta-
tistical analysis, which requires large enough groups to add credibility
to the analysis. Thus, actuaries must balance between considerations
of refined and homogenous risk classes with sufficiently large, and
therefore credible, risk classes.133 For example, the Actuarial Stan-
dards Board, the organization that develops standards and guidance
cation, in FOUNDATIONS OF CASUALTY ACTUARIAL SCIENCE 287, 292–301 (1st ed.
1990); Michael A. Walters, Risk Classification Standards, 68 PROCEEDINGS CASU-
ALTY ACTUARIAL SOC’Y 1, 7–9 (1981) (delineating seven standards that promote
homogeneity, reasonable relationships between characteristics and risk, and
characteristics that are well-defined and practical).
127. STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES, supra note 107, at 11.
128. ON RISK CLASSIFICATION, supra note 24, at 4.
129. See STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES, supra note 107, at 11 (discussing the need for pre-
dictive stability); Efficiency and Fairness, supra note 111, at 412 (noting the need
for risk characteristics to be reliable); Wortham, supra note 42, at 846 (noting
that risk characteristics should be stable, reliable, and administratively
convenient).
130. ON RISK CLASSIFICATION, supra note 24, at 32.
131. Soc’y of Actuaries, Principles of Actuarial Science, 44 TRANSACTIONS SOC’Y ACTUA-
RIES 565, 599 (1992) (arguing “accuracy” is a poor principle because of the ten-
dency to mislead). Additionally, the risk characteristics employed are also likely
not completely accurate, thus introducing further uncertainty into the model.
132. See generally ACTUARIAL STANDARD OF PRACTICE NO. 12 (ACTUARIAL STANDARDS
BD. 2005), http://www.actuarialstandardsboard.org/pdf/asops/asop012_101.pdf
[https://perma.unl.edu/EVA2-EPXR]; ON RISK CLASSIFICATION, supra note 24;
STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES, supra note 107; Efficiency and Fairness, supra note
111.
133. See ON RISK CLASSIFICATION, supra note 24, at 51 (“Achieving a balance between
homogeneity and credibility is a major consideration in the establishment of risk
classes.”).
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for actuaries involved in developing and updating risk classification
systems, notes: “It is desirable that risk classes in a risk classification
system be large enough to allow credible statistical inferences regard-
ing expected outcomes. When the available data are not sufficient for
this purpose, the actuary should balance considerations of predictabil-
ity with considerations of homogeneity.”134
Occupation provides an illustrative example of this concept. Sup-
pose a disability insurer takes into account a person’s occupation in
his or her risk classification and therefore utilizes physician as a risk
characteristic. However, based on historical data, the insurer finds
that certain sub-specialties are riskier than others. For example,
emergency room physicians may be more likely to submit insurance
claims than others. The insurer may consider refining the risk class by
physician specialty. However, if there are a limited number of people
in certain physician specialties, there may not be sufficient historical
data to produce credible estimates of risk across all sub-specialties.135
Thus, the actuaries establishing this risk classification system would
have to balance the increased homogeneity of physician sub-special-
ties with the potential decreased statistical accuracy.
2. Operational Considerations
If statistical considerations push actuaries to strive for the most
efficient and ideal risk classification system, operational considera-
tions pull the actuaries back to earth and ground them in the realities.
For example, a primary operational consideration is the administra-
tive burden of employing a risk characteristic. Insurers will not use a
risk characteristic if the administrative expense is more than the
value it provides in differentiating individuals into separate risk clas-
ses, even when the characteristic improves prediction of risk.136 Oper-
ational considerations encourage the use of risk characteristics that
ease the burden on underwriters. Desirable risk characteristics have
objective definitions and are measurable and verifiable.137
It is inexpensive and easy to determine an insured’s sex; it is expensive and
difficult to determine his or her habits and character. Some variables are
made on the basis of risk classes, then, not because they are more accurate or
134. ACTUARIAL STANDARD OF PRACTICE NO. 12 § 3.3.2 (ACTUARIAL STANDARDS BD.
2005), http://www.actuarialstandardsboard.org/pdf/asops/asop012_101.pdf
[https://perma.unl.edu/EVA2-EPXR].
135. See ON RISK CLASSIFICATION, supra note 24, at 51 (explaining the credibility of
data for an occupation as a whole will be greater than the credibility of the data
for each specialty).
136. STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES, supra note 107, at 7.
137. Id. at 13. Some view this as an operational consideration since measurability and
verifiability streamline the underwriting process. See id.
652 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96:624
preferable to others in any ultimate sense, but because they are available and
useful.138
Another common operational goal is to minimize applicants’ abili-
ties and desires to manipulate their apparent risk. Actuaries aim for
risk characteristics that are difficult to misrepresent on applica-
tions.139 For example, if asked about the number of cigarettes or alco-
holic beverages one has each week, an applicant could easily disclose a
deflated amount. An applicant’s ability to manipulate his or her appli-
cation is directly tied to the measurability or verifiability of a charac-
teristic. Individuals could similarly try to manipulate information
about their weight, but this is more likely to be reported in medical
records and thus subject to insurer follow-up and evaluation if the in-
formation in medical records and the application conflict.140
3. Social Considerations
Ultimately, an insurer could develop an extremely efficient and ac-
curate risk classification system but be left without consumers to join
the pool if the criteria it uses are objectionable to the public. Thus,
when establishing a risk classification system, insurers weigh societal
views of acceptability.141 Four common factors affect the public’s toler-
ance for use of a risk characteristic. While the mathematical modeling
and actuarial science do not require consideration of any of these fac-
tors when designing a theoretically efficient risk classification system,
insurers may end up considering them due to the economic impact of
consumer preferences or objections.
First, from the consumer perspective, the degree to which an indi-
vidual can control a characteristic alters perceptions of fairness.142
Arguably, it is patently unfair to deny someone insurance or charge
higher premiums based on a risk factor that is not a choice. Under this
logic, characteristics such as race and gender are more likely pro-
scribed from use in risk classification than factors within the individ-
ual’s control such as smoking or an individual’s geographic area.143
138. DISTRIBUTING RISK, supra note 32, at 85.
139. STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES, supra note 107, at 13.
140. An applicant’s motivation to manipulate his data is minimized if insurers avoid
extreme discontinuities between risk classes. ON RISK CLASSIFICATION, supra
note 24, at 47–48. When a risk characteristic is a continuous variable, such as age
or blood pressure, setting cutoff thresholds for each risk class can lead to large
jumps in premium as one moves along the continuum. Id.
141. STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES, supra note 107, at 14. Although similar, Abraham
classifies this as “admissibility.” See Efficiency and Fairness, supra note 111, at
419–20.
142. See Understanding Insurance, supra note 32, at 214–15 (noting individual control
is possibly the most frequently cited social fairness argument); Holmes, supra
note 25, at 563.
143. Gaulding, supra note 112, at 1674.
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This argument’s underpinnings stem from egalitarian theories of
distributive justice such as from John Rawls and Norman Daniels.144
Drawing from Rawls’s veil of ignorance, a professor discussing actua-
rial versus social fairness notes:
If an individual does not know that he would be born into a set of circum-
stances that would lead to diabetes and hypertension or to healthy longevity,
how would he set the insurance premiums from the position of uncertainty?
Behind a veil of ignorance, any rational, risk-averse person would choose com-
munity rating, that is, charging everyone the same price, regardless of risk,
except when that risk is significantly within our control.145
Of course, individual control is a conceptual distinction fraught
with controversy.146 For example, behaviors such as smoking or
drinking that are outwardly personal choices may in fact be less con-
trollable for individuals with tobacco addiction or alcohol depen-
dency.147 Similarly, geographic ratings are commonly used risk
factors in home and auto insurance, but where one lives may be less a
matter of choice than of economic, familial, or professional necessity
or, most problematic, of societal discrimination.148 Normatively, it
seems that social objections to using involuntary risk characteristics
depend in part on how they are framed. For example, taking family
history into account raises fewer hackles than other uncontrollable
traits.
Second, fair discrimination and actuarial justification require only
statistical correlation, not causation.149 However, the social accepta-
bility of the use of a characteristic increases if the trait is intuitively
related to cost.150 For example, while age is clearly linked to expected
costs for life insurers, the use of credit scores in auto insurance may
raise eyebrows given the tenuous relationship between the character-
istic and expected cost. The further removed a characteristic is from
the actual cause of loss, the more questionable its use becomes.151 In
144. DISTRIBUTING RISK, supra note 32; Holmes, supra note 25, at 577.
145. Saurabh Jha, Punishing the Lemon: The Ethics of Actuarial Fairness, 9 J. AM. C.
RADIOLOGY 887, 888 (2012).
146. See Understanding Insurance, supra note 32, at 215 (noting characteristics that
ostensibly are matters of choice, such as smoking, eating, or working out, may be
the result of habit, addiction, or socioeconomic factors beyond the control of the
individual).
147. DISTRIBUTING RISK, supra note 32, at 29.
148. See id. (calling an individual’s choice of where they live “semidetermined” and
noting that classification in fire and auto insurance should account for this lack of
complete control when setting rates).
149. ACTUARIAL STANDARD OF PRACTICE NO. 12 §§ 3.2.1, 3.2.2 (ACTUARIAL STANDARDS
BD. 2005), http://www.actuarialstandardsboard.org/pdf/asops/asop012_101.pdf
[https://perma.unl.edu/EVA2-EPXR]; Gaulding, supra note 112, at 1658; Jha,
supra note 145, at 887 (“Yet for insurers seeking to slice and dice the population
into a profitable mix, correlation is sufficient.”).
150. Finger, supra note 126, at 296.
151. Austin, supra note 30, at 559–63; Gaulding, supra note 112.
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these cases, either a characteristic is a proxy factor for a variable that
is much harder to identify or measure152 or insurers are using a char-
acteristic as a measure of risk simply for convenience,153 both of which
are problematic motivations from a social acceptability perspective.
Third, an insurance classification system is less likely to be accept-
able to consumers if it leads to unaffordable premiums. As insurance
classification systems become more refined, groups in the highest risk
classifications could face steep premiums, which may effectively bar
them from entering the market. For example, insurer use of genetic
test results raises the specter of a genetic underclass.154 Even absent
fears of alienating portions of society, insurers may strive for in-
creased affordability to avoid public perceptions that the system is in-
accessible to some and therefore unjust.155
Finally, the use of a risk characteristic may be socially unaccept-
able if it is viewed as a violation of privacy. An insurance applicant
may not bat an eye at providing information regarding occupation,
age, or marital status but may view questions about psychological dis-
orders, genetic test results, or sexual orientation as unacceptable in-
vasions of privacy. Additionally, insurer access to information about
the public without its knowledge or consent may violate notions of pri-
vacy and therefore acceptability.156
152. Hartford Accident & Indem. v. Ins. Comm’r, 482 A.2d 542, 550 (Pa. 1984) (Hutch-
inson, J., concurring) (“What does appear is only a statistical correlation between
sex and the incidence of auto accidents. This correlation simply provides a conve-
nient measuring rod for setting rate differentials occasioned by other factors not
so easily identified or quantified.”)
153. Id.; Nondiscrimination in Insurance: Hearing on H.R. 100 Before the H. Comm.
on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong. (1980) (statement of Hon. Barbara
Mikulski); Austin, supra note 30, at 534 (“However much the companies plead
happenstance, insurance ‘risk’ classifications correlate with a fairly simplistic
and static notion of social stratification that is familiar to everyone.”).
154. See Holmes, supra note 25, at 569; Subramanian et al., supra note 53, at 532.
155. See ON RISK CLASSIFICATION, supra note 24, at 59 (noting an insurance system
may consider questions of affordability due to public perceptions, even if this
makes it more difficult to attain other criteria).
156. For example, in 2014 there was an uproar in the United Kingdom when it was
publicized that insurers were accessing aggregate, anonymous patient data from
the National Health System (NHS). See Amie Keeley, The Society Which Used
Data on Every NHS Patient—And Used It to Guide Insurance Companies on Pre-
miums, DAILYMAIL (Feb. 23, 2014), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2566
397/The-insurance-firms-buy-data-NHS-patient.html; Randeep Ramesh, NHS
Patient Data to Be Made Available for Sale to Drug and Insurance Firms, GUARD-
IAN (Jan. 19, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/society/2014/jan/19/nhs-pa-
tient-data-available-companies-buy [https://perma.unl.edu/4TBS-CAYS].
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V. GENETIC TEST RESULTS AND INSURANCE
A. Genetic Test Results as Risk Characteristics
Although insurer use of predictive genetic test results is a recent
possibility, insurers have long employed family history as an imper-
fect proxy for genetic risk.157 Family history, however, is a notoriously
inaccurate and imprecise risk prediction tool due, in part, to patients’
potentially incomplete knowledge or misunderstanding of diagno-
ses.158 Furthermore, family history is self-reported, making manipu-
lation conceivable and verification nearly impossible. Especially when
compared with family history, genetic test results meet many of the
statistical and operational considerations important for risk classifica-
tion because genetic test results can be verified and may be more accu-
rate than family history in specific contexts.
Precise knowledge of hereditary risk also allows insurers to refine
risk classes into more homogeneous groups. Huntington’s Disease
(HD), a fatal, neurodegenerative genetic condition,159 can be used as
an example. If one has a deleterious variant associated with HD, there
is essentially a one hundred percent likelihood she will develop the
disease, unless she dies prior to onset.160 If an individual’s parent has
HD, he has a fifty percent chance of inheriting the HD variant and
thus a fifty percent chance of developing the disease.161 When only
family history is available to an insurer, it may deny a policy or charge
higher premiums to every individual with a family history of the dis-
ease.162 However, if allowed to use both family history and genetic-
test results, the insurer can accept those fifty percent who did not in-
herit the deleterious variant from their parent.163 Here, use of genetic
test results is arguably beneficial because insurance access expands
due to the availability of more accurate risk predictors.
157. See AM. COUNCIL OF LIFE INS., supra note 67, at 26.
158. Elissa M. Ozanne et al., Bias in the Reporting of Family History: Implications for
Clinical Care, 21 J. GENETIC COUNSELING 547, 547 (2012) (finding that accuracy
of family history can depend upon whether the information is from the maternal
or paternal side of the family); see R.J. Mitchell et al., Accuracy of Reporting of
Family History of Colorectal Cancer, 53 GUT 291, 292 (2004). But see Harvey J.
Murff et al., Does This Patient Have a Family History of Cancer?: An Evidence-
Based Analysis of the Accuracy of Family Cancer History, 292 JAMA 1480, 1480
(2004) (finding that family history of some cancers in first-degree relatives is gen-
erally accurate but that other types of family history reporting are less accurate).
See generally Eugene C. Rich et al., Reconsidering the Family History in Primary
Care, 19 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 273 (2004).
159. Simon C. Warby et al., Huntington Disease, GENEREVIEWS, https://www.ncbi.nlm
.nih.gov/books/NBK1305 (last updated Dec. 11, 2014).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Holmes, supra note 25, at 540.
163. Id.; see AM. COUNCIL OF LIFE INS., supra note 67.
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However, few genetic test results are as strongly predictive as HD.
In fact, given the current state of clinical knowledge, much genomic
information is remarkably unpredictive.164 Many genetic test results
fall along the continuum of one hundred percent predictive to com-
pletely unpredictive.165 Therefore, the type of condition that is tested
for greatly impacts the relevance it will have for risk classification.
Test results are also often much more complicated than a simple
positive or negative; instead, the relevance of a test result must be
interpreted in light of the individual being tested. Take, for example, a
woman who has undergone genomic sequencing and is found to have a
variant in the BRCA1 gene. Individuals with harmful changes, called
pathogenic variants, in BRCA1/2 are more likely to develop breast or
ovarian cancer than individuals in the general population.166 Once a
woman receives this result, she must undergo further evaluation. As a
first step, the testing laboratory and doctors must determine whether
the change in her genetic code is pathogenic (one that puts her at an
increased risk of developing breast and ovarian cancer).167 There are
many different changes or variants that can appear in a gene, but not
all are harmful.168 The laboratory’s interpretation may depend on the
woman’s type of genetic change, ethnicity, and family history of can-
cer.169 Recent studies highlight relatively high rates of disagreement
across laboratories when interpreting the same variants.170
Even if the laboratory classifies the woman’s genetic change as a
pathogenic variant, it does not necessarily mean she will develop can-
cer. Unlike HD, individuals with pathogenic variants in BRCA1/2 will
not always develop clinical symptoms. In genetics terminology, this is
referred to as “penetrance,” or the probability of developing the condi-
tion if one has a pathogenic variant in the associated gene.171 Esti-
mates of the penetrance of BRCA1/2 greatly vary depending on the
164. See Michael C. Adams et al., The Promise and Peril of Genomic Screening in the
General Population, 18 GENETICS MED. 593 (2015); Evans et al., supra note 15.
165. See PRIVACY AND PROGRESS, supra note 44, at 114–15.
166. BRCA1 and BRCA2 are genes associated with hereditary breast and ovarian can-
cer (HBOC). Nancie Petrucelli et al., BRCA1- and BRCA2-Associated Hereditary
Breast and Ovarian Cancer, GENEREVIEWS, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/
NBK1247 (last updated Dec. 15, 2016).
167. See Sue Richards et al., Standards and Guidelines for the Interpretation of Se-
quence Variants: A Joint Consensus Recommendation of the American College of
Medical Genetics and Genomics and the Association for Molecular Pathology, 17
GENETICS MED. 405, 411 (2015).
168. See infra subsection VII.D.5.
169. See generally Richards et al., supra note 167.
170. Laura M. Amendola et al., Performance of ACMG-AMP Variant-Interpretation
Guidelines Among Nine Laboratories in the Clinical Sequencing Exploratory Re-
search Consortium, 98 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 1067, 1067 (2016) [hereinafter
Amendola et al., Performance of Interpretation Guidelines].
171. ESSENTIALLY YOURS, supra note 91.
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study context but generally range from approximately 45–65% for
breast cancer and 10–40% for ovarian cancer.172 Thus, women with
pathogenic variants in BRCA1/2 are not guaranteed to have cancer
but have a much greater risk than the lifetime risk for women in the
general population—12.3% and 1.4%, respectively.173
Penetrance estimates vary greatly across genetic conditions. For
example, familial adenomatous polyposis (FAP), a genetic condition
associated with colon cancer, has essentially a one hundred percent
chance of colon polyps and subsequent cancer.174 In contrast, familial
hypercholesterolemia (FH), a condition associated with coronary ar-
tery disease and heart attack, has a penetrance of fifty percent by age
fifty.175 At the other end of the spectrum, hereditary hemochro-
matosis, a condition related to high absorption of iron that, if un-
treated, can lead to organ failure, has an estimated overall penetrance
of two percent or less; however, men display clinical symptoms more
often than women.176 Thus, genetic test results are not uniform. The
results’ relevance and meaning will differ, not just across genetic tests
but across gender, ethnicity, and the extent of family history of
disease.
A factor of paramount interest to insurers is the positive predictive
value of a risk characteristic. In genetic testing, the positive predictive
value of a risk characteristic is the proportion of individuals with posi-
tive test results who will develop the disease.177 While insurers will
weigh additional factors,178 the positive predictive value is a particu-
larly important metric because it directly relates to the accuracy of the
172. Final Recommendation Statement: BRCA-Related Cancer: Risk Assessment, Ge-
netic Counseling, and Genetic Testing, U.S. PREVENTIVE SERVS. TASK FORCE,
http://www.uspreventiveservicestaskforce.org/Page/Document/Recommendation-
StatementFinal/brca-related-cancer-risk-assessment-genetic-counseling-and-ge-
netic-testing [https://perma.unl.edu/6DM3-RL52] (last updated Dec. 2013);
Petrucelli et al., supra note 166, at 246–47
173. Final Recommendation Statement, supra note 172.
174. Kory W. Jasperson, Swati G. Patel & Dennis J. Ahnen, APC-Associated Polyposis
Conditions, GENEREVIEWS, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK1345 (last
updated Feb. 2, 2017).
175. Emily Youngblom, Mitchel Pariani & J.W. Knowles, Familial Hypercholester-
olemia, GENEREVIEWS, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK174884 (last up-
dated Dec. 8, 2016).
176. Rebecca Seckington & Lawrie Powell, HFE-Associated Hereditary Hemochro-
matosis, GENEREVIEWS, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK1440 (last up-
dated Sept. 17, 2015). These penetrance estimates refer to clinically defined
symptoms. Id. While people with pathogenic variants in the gene associated with
hemochromatosis are likely to develop biochemically defined iron overload, they
are unlikely to present clinical symptoms. Id.
177. AM. COUNCIL OF LIFE INS., supra note 67, at 21; ROBERT DAVID CAMPBELL BRACK-
ENRIDGE & W. JOHN ELDER, MEDICAL SELECTION OF LIFE RISKS 182 (Stockton
Press 1992); GENETIC TESTING WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 63;
178. See BRACKENRIDGE & ELDER, supra note 177, at 184 (highlighting a list of other
questions an insurer may consider).
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characteristic as an approximation of risk. For a test with a sixty per-
cent positive predictive value, sixty out of one hundred individuals
who test positive will develop the condition. For an insurance com-
pany, this equates to forty people for whom the risk is not accurately
calculated. An insurer may find this level of inaccuracy perfectly ac-
ceptable if there is no better test available to determine who will de-
velop symptoms, or if the condition is severe and likely to result in
high claim payouts. However, a lower positive predictive value may be
unacceptable; these are determinations that must be made in light of
the context and the statistical, operational, and social
considerations.179
The positive predictive value of a clinical test is a measure of three
factors: sensitivity, specificity, and prevalence.180 Sensitivity is the
ability of the test to measure true positives—the individuals who re-
ceive a positive test result and actually have the disease.181 In other
words, the more false negatives a test produces, the lower the sensitiv-
ity.182 For example, if a test has a sensitivity of 0.7, seventy percent of
people who will develop the disease will receive a positive test result—
a true positive—and thirty percent of people who will develop the dis-
ease will receive a negative test result—a false negative. Specificity,
on the other hand, is the ability of a test to measure true negatives;
the more false positives a test produces, the lower the specificity.183 If
a test has a specificity of 0.8, eighty percent of people who truly do not
have the disease will receive a negative test result—a true negative—
and twenty percent of people who truly do not have the disease will
receive a positive test result—a false positive.
The prevalence of a condition also affects the positive predictive
value. Prevalence measures the rate of a disease in the entire popula-
tion.184 Prevalence alters the predictive value because as the rate of
disease increases, the total number of positive tests will increase
179. See generally AM. COUNCIL OF LIFE INS., supra note 67, at 21; ON RISK CLASSIFICA-
TION, supra note 24.
180. See Adams et al., supra note 164, at 593–94. The analytic validity also measures
sensitivity and specificity, but this indicates whether the test actually works. See
ACCE Model List of 44 Targeted Questions Aimed at a Comprehensive Review of
Genetic Testing, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION [hereinafter ACCE
Model], https://www.cdc.gov/genomics/gtesting/acce/acce_proj.htm [https://perma
.unl.edu/DK4E-CJRU]. Clinical validity is whether the results from the test indi-
cate true disease, the relevant concept in this Article. Id.
181. Douglas G. Altman & J. Martin Bland, Diagnostic Tests 1: Sensitivity and Speci-
ficity, 308 BRIT. MED. J. 1552 (1994).
182. AM. COUNCIL OF LIFE INS., supra note 67, at 21.
183. Id.
184. Douglas G. Altman & J. Martin Bland, Statistics Notes: Diagnostic Tests 2: Pre-
dictive Values, 309 BRIT. MED. J. 102, 102 (1994).
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while the number of false positives will decrease.185 Thus, other fac-
tors being equal, conditions with higher prevalence are more likely to
have a higher positive predictive values.186
It is important to remember sensitivity, specificity, and prevalence
of genetic conditions are estimates based on current best understand-
ing of genomics. Many factors will affect a genetic test’s sensitivity
and specificity. First, incomplete penetrance will increase the number
of people who receive false positives because a portion of people who
test positive will never develop the disease. Similarly, for some genetic
conditions, the symptoms expressed range from mild to severe187 or
cause different underlying conditions.188 For example, in FH, symp-
toms of coronary heart disease can have varying severity,189 and
BRCA1/2 is associated with multiple diseases from breast or ovarian
cancer to pancreatic and prostate cancers.190 Such variable symptoms
complicate insurance calculations because some individuals may expe-
rience symptoms severe enough to trigger an insurance claim while
others will have mild symptoms but never need insurance. Finally, the
number of genetic changes affecting disease complicates test interpre-
tation and performance. These changes can be either within a gene—
where a range of changes within the gene can cause symptoms—or
across multiple genes—where, as in the case of BRCA1/2, changes in
different genes can result in the same disease.191
Given the variability of penetrance, symptoms, underlying genetic
causes, and other factors across genetic conditions, the operational,
statistical, and social considerations of risk classification will also
185. Mathematically, the total number of positives equals the true positives plus the
false positives. Id. The true positive rate equates to [prevalence * sensitivity], a
number that will increase as prevalence increases. Id. The number of false posi-
tives equates to [(1 - prevalence) * (1 - specificity)], a number that will decrease as
prevalence increases. Id.
186. Insurers may also be interested in negative predictive value. This is a measure of
the proportion of individuals with negative test results that truly do not have the
disease. Id. For example, if an insurer is accounting for negative test results in its
risk classification system, it will want to make sure a large portion of negative
results are not false negatives. AM. COUNCIL OF LIFE INS., supra note 67, at 21
(noting both negative and positive predictive value are relevant to insurers).
187. This is called “variable expressivity.” MARK SANDERS & JOHN BOWMAN, GENETIC
ANALYSIS: AN INTEGRATED APPROACH G-11, G-17 (2012) (defining the term as “va-
riation in the degree, magnitude, or intensity of expression of” the observable
physical characteristics or traits).
188. In genetics, this is referred to as “pleiotropy.” Id. at G-12 (defining pleiotropy as
“a single gene mutation that affects multiple and seemingly unconnected proper-
ties of an organism”).
189. Youngblom et al., supra note 175.
190. Petrucelli et al., supra note 166.
191. These concepts are referred to, respectively, as allelic heterogeneity and genetic
heterogeneity. Charles R. Scriver, Allelic and Locus Heterogeneity, in ENCYCLOPE-
DIA OF LIFE SCIENCES (2006) (abstract).
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vary across genetic tests. In some cases, genetic test results can make
risk classes more homogenous, while in others a result may be too im-
precise or inaccurate to be operationally or statistically useful. Condi-
tions with high predictive values tend to be single-gene disorders,
diseases caused by specific variants in one or a few genes, such as HD,
BRCA1/2, and FH.192 Conditions with low predictive values are more
likely to be caused by multiple genes,193 interactions between genes
and the environment,194 and genes with low penetrance.195 Most ge-
netic changes that are found to contribute to common diseases, such
as diabetes and heart disease, fall in the complex, low-predictive cate-
gory.196 Despite the differences of predictive value across genetic con-
ditions, debates regarding insurer use of genetic test results often
reference highly penetrant genes such as BRCA1/2 or HD without
fully acknowledging the breadth of information that can be produced
by genetic tests.197 Indeed, single-gene disorders are very rare and
account for only a small portion of the genomic information available
from sequencing.198 Additionally, as further study occurs through ef-
forts such as the PMI, it is much more likely researchers will unearth
complex associations with multiple gene and environmental causes
and generally low predictive values than discover new single-gene dis-
orders.199 Thus, although discussions of insurer use of genetic test re-
sults often collapse all results into a monolithic concept, it is clear that
failure to differentiate the types of genetic tests available misses sig-
nificant nuances.
B. Current Use of Genetic Test Results
In the ongoing debate over insurer use of genetic test results, two
questions naturally arise. First, To what extent are these insurers ac-
cessing genetic test results? And second, To what extent are they us-
ing the results?
192. See GENETICS & INS. COMM., DEP’T OF HEALTH, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT (2000),
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20120503132741/http://www.dh.gov
.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/AnnualReports/DH_074080?ss
SourceSiteId=ab (discussing the differences between single-gene disorders, mul-
tigene disorders, and chromosomal disorders).
193. These are referred to as multigene conditions. Id.
194. These are referred to as multifactorial conditions. SANDERS & BOWMAN, supra
note 187, at G-10.
195. GENETICS & INS. COMM., supra note 192.
196. See id.
197. See generally C.D. Daykin et al., Genetics and Insurance—Some Social Policy Is-
sues, 9 BRIT. ACTUARIAL J. 787 (2003); Yann Joly et al., Genetic Discrimination
and Life Insurance: A Systematic Review of the Evidence, 11 BMC MED. 1 (2013);
Robert Klitzman, Views of Discrimination Among Individuals Confronting Ge-
netic Disease, 19 J. GENETIC COUNSELING 68 (2010).
198. See PRIVACY AND PROGRESS, supra note 44, at 18.
199. Evans, supra note 53, at 2670–71.
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1. Insurer Access to Genetic Test Results
Generally, insurers do not directly inquire about genetic testing or
its results in applications despite their common collection of family
medical history.200 Although genetic test results may be of interest, no
insurer is presently willing to break the status quo norms for fear of
bad press.201 Some insurance applications are likely to be accepted
without any further inquiry beyond the initial application questions
because insurers have little motivation to search unless the margin-
ally greater risk prediction that the characteristic provides saves more
than the cost to find and measure the new risk characteristic.202 How-
ever, insurers utilize medical exams, physician inquiries, and requests
for medical records when further information regarding a person’s
risk profile is needed, and insurers could discover genetic test results
through these means.203 Thus, even without asking in the initial ap-
plication, insurers could obtain applicants’ genetic test results during
later stages of the application process.
Insurance companies also gain information about applicants
through the Medical Information Bureau (MIB). MIB is a nonprofit
organization that compiles a database for insurance companies to
share broad-level information about applicants.204 When an individ-
ual applies for insurance with one company, the company can provide
applicant information to the MIB, such as the name, hazardous avoca-
tions, and medical information.205 Subsequent insurers are then able
to cross-check new applicants against information from other insurers
in order to help prevent fraud or overinsurance.206
Although there is no evidence insurers are currently doing so, they
could also learn of genetic risk through direct testing of applicant sam-
ples themselves.207 This practice would be fully outlawed in some
states and would require permission in others because of informed
200. See Klitzman et al., supra note 1, at 1455 (noting insurers do not want to be the
first to ask about genetic test results).
201. Id.
202. Swedloff, supra note 121, at 351; see also supra subsection IV.C.2 (discussing op-
erational considerations).
203. Sharona Hoffman, Medical Big Data and Big Data Quality Problems, 21 CONN.
INS. L.J. 289, 291–92 (2014); Wolf & Kahn, supra note 111. Thus, whether or not
genetic test results are known by physicians or recorded in a medical record di-
rectly impacts the likelihood that an insurance company may gain knowledge of a
person’s prior testing. For this reason, genetic and other healthcare professionals
sometimes advise patients to secure any desired insurance coverage prior to un-
dergoing testing. Klitzman et al., supra note 1, at 1856.
204. Harry Ostrer et al., Insurance and Genetic Testing: Where Are We Now?, 52 AM. J.
HUM. GENETICS 565, 566 (1993).
205. See generally id.; The Facts About MIB, MIB, http://www.mib.com/
facts_about_mib.html [https://perma.unl.edu/8UYS-66CK].
206. See Ostrer et al., supra note 205, at 567.
207. AM. COUNCIL OF LIFE INS., supra note 67, at 14.
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consent laws or bans on required genetic testing.208 However, in
states that lack legislation, insurers could collect blood samples and
perform tests directly, which may become a more realistic possibility
given the decreasing cost of genomic sequencing.209
2. Insurer Use of Genetic Test Results
Despite the lack of direct inquiry, insurers maintain they need to
be able to access genetic testing to defend against adverse selection.
There is documentation for several genetic conditions that shows
high-risk individuals are more likely to purchase insurance to protect
against future loss.210 To avoid information asymmetry, insurers
want to have access to any information about genetic test results that
might motivate individual applicants to request high levels of insur-
ance. Thus, insurers want access to all genetic test results so they
have the power to decide which are relevant to each individual’s
policy.
Even if insurers gain access to genetic test results, it is unclear
how often they are taken into account during individual underwriting.
There is evidence insurers do consider genetic test results for a select
number of tests they deem relevant.211 For example, insurers may in-
corporate results of diagnostic genetic testing or results for highly pre-
dictive genetic conditions. However, they are unlikely to find the vast
majority of genetic test results helpful in the risk classification pro-
cess.212 Indeed, at this point in time, insurer use of genetic test results
with low predictive value is theoretical. Insurers are likely only using
a few types of genetic tests that are highly predictive and have a suffi-
cient evidence base. In Canada, for example, life insurance companies
generally consider thirteen highly predictive conditions when classify-
ing risk.213
208. See statutes cited supra note 60.
209. James Evans, Bradford Powell & Jonathan Berg, Finding the Rare Pathogenic
Variants in a Human Genome, 317 JAMA 1904, 1904 (2017).
210. See Donald H. Taylor et al., Genetic Testing for Alzheimer’s and Long-Term Care
Insurance, 2 HEALTH AFF. 102 (2010); see also Subramanian et al., supra note 53,
at 532 (noting women with BRCA1 or BRCA2 mutations, associated with an in-
creased risk for breast and ovarian cancer, may purchase more life insurance);
Cathleen D. Zick et al., Genetic Testing for Alzheimer’s Disease and Its Impact on
Insurance Purchasing Behavior, 24 HEALTH AFF. 483, 486 (2005).
211. GENETIC TESTING WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 63, at 4 (“[A]lthough no
insurers are now requiring genetic testing, if the results of genetic testing are in
an applicant’s medical record and are relevant, insurers are likely to include such
results in the underwriting process.”).
212. ANGUS S. MACDONALD, THE ACTUARIAL RELEVANCE OF GENETIC INFORMATION IN
THE LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE CONTEXT 2 (2011); MacDonald, Genetic Factors,
supra note 15; MacDonald, Risks Are Too Small, supra note 1.
213. See ROBERT C.W. HOWARD, GENETIC TESTING MODEL: IF UNDERWRITERS HAD NO
ACCESS TO KNOWN RESULTS (2014) (modeling the impact on the insurance indus-
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As scientific understanding grows, more conditions may be taken
into consideration, but given the current nascent state of genetic
knowledge and rarity of most highly penetrant conditions, relatively
few test results would be utilized by insurers. Under the status quo,
the insurer holds the power to determine when a test crosses scientific
and actuarial thresholds, despite the wide-ranging societal and scien-
tific questions that affect the positive predictive value and validity of
tests. Additionally, the decisions regarding which risk characteristics
to employ, and what scientific and actuarial evidence supports these
actions, are currently completed within the opaque insurance indus-
try. Individual applicants are unlikely to know what genetic test re-
sults may be of interest to each insurer and why. A rational
discrimination approach adds transparency to this system by requir-
ing documentation, and sometimes approval, of the evidence that sup-
ports insurer use of each type of genetic test.
VI. ARE TRANSPARENCY AND OVERSIGHT NECESSARY?
In a competitive insurance market, companies have an incentive to
accurately predict risk or face the chance of losing customers.214 Com-
petitive advantage occurs if an insurer develops a more refined classi-
fication system than other companies.215 Competitive disadvantage
occurs if insurers misuse genetic test results and incorrectly assign a
low-risk individual to a high-risk class. Market proponents argue
when insurers properly classify genetic risk, affected individuals can
reapply elsewhere and likely receive a policy from a different com-
pany.216 One question that arises under this theory is whether the
increased oversight or documentation requirements of the rational
discrimination approach are necessary. Is it enough to leave it to the
market to properly classify genetic test results? These questions are
especially relevant given insurers only use a handful of genetic test
results. This Part argues the market alone is insufficient to address
concerns of insurer use of genetic test results for four reasons: existing
evidence of insurer misuse of genetic test results, the lack of trans-
parency within the insurance industry, incentives within the industry
try if it is not permitted to use genetic test results in underwriting). Thirteen
conditions were modeled, suggesting that these are the most likely to be used and
thus the ones most likely to impact the industry if removed. See id. Similarly,
when a list of most relevant genetic conditions was drafted in the 1990s for the
United Kingdom, eight disorders were listed. Macdonald & Yu, supra note 66, at
346. For examples of genetic tests that are highly predictive, see supra section
V.A.
214. Furthermore, insurers have incentives to offer as many policies as possible with-
out denying large portions of their risk pool. See AM. COUNCIL OF LIFE INS., supra
note 67, at 15.
215. See infra section VI.C.
216. GENETIC TESTING WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 63.
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to adopt use of new risk characteristics as early as possible, and the
societal effects of fear of genetic discrimination.
A. Insurer Misuse of Genetic Test Results
The market may eventually sort out how genetic test results
should be efficiently and fairly utilized by insurers as measured by
economic pricing. However, clinical and technological understanding
of genetics and genomics is still developing. There has long been dis-
cussion in the medical field regarding the appropriate standards to
determine whether and when genetic tests should be utilized in
clinical care.217 Transitioning the standards and challenges from the
clinical realm to insurance will likely prove equally, if not more, chal-
lenging. Therefore, during the time of flux in the creation of accurate
actuarial models, there is likely to be misapplication of genetic test
results. Anecdotal evidence supports this concern. For example, insur-
ers have denied individuals when they carry one variant for a condi-
tion but not the two needed to be affected. In genetics terminology,
insurers have denied carriers even though they will never develop the
condition.218 An insurer also denied a policy for an individual who
tested negative for Huntington’s Disease because he “could get Hunt-
ington’s Disease” in the future—a statement that is unequivocally
false.219
Anecdotal stories such as these are often raised by proponents of a
prohibitive approach. They argue insurers should be disallowed from
considering genetic test results because the dangers of misuse are just
too great.220 However, it is in an insurer’s best interest to correctly
assess risk.221 The insurance company who denied the individual
based on his HD-carrier status lost a customer and the monetary
value of the premiums he should have been offered given his true ex-
pected risk. Thus, misuse of genetic test results creates economic
harms for both insurers and applicants. Competitive insurance mar-
kets may eventually address these misuses and mistakes, but harm
ensues in the interim.
217. See James E. Haddow & Glenn E. Palomaki, ACCE: A Model Process for Evaluat-
ing Data on Emerging Genetic Tests, in HUMAN GENOME EPIDEMIOLOGY 217 (Muin
J. Khoury et al. eds., 2004).
218. Ostrer et al., supra note 205.
219. Bev Heim-Meyers, Chair, Canadian Coal. for Genetic Fairness, Chief Exec. Of-
ficer, Huntington Soc’y of Can., Testimony to the Canadian Parliament Proceed-
ings of the Standing Senate Committee on Human Rights (Dec. 10, 2014).
220. Id.
221. See supra section IV.B.
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B. Transparency of the Insurance Market
The theoretical possibility that the market will adjust to the most
efficient outcome implies a level of transparency in the system that
simply does not exist. If an individual is unfairly, under actuarial
standards, denied a life insurance policy by one company, he or she
may be able to secure a policy from a different insurer. This, however,
requires the individual to know the reason for his or her denial; under-
stand the nature of insurance risk classification; have the knowledge,
time, and resources to compare other insurance offerings; and apply to
a different insurer or insurers.222 In reality, the nature of the insur-
ance market does not support transparent practices for consumers.223
Consumers are often expected to shop around for the best price in
other competitive markets, and it is not seen as unfair to require them
to have the wherewithal to do so. However, given unfair discrimina-
tion is an illegal unfair trade practice under many states’ UTPAs,224 it
is inappropriate to place the burden on individuals to do the work to
find a company that is following the law—especially in an environ-
ment where transparency is wanting.
Additionally, the MIB distorts this market competition when in-
surers transfer information about applicants between one another.
Proponents of the market argue that insurance companies have differ-
ent appetites for risk and that where one may deny a woman with a
positive BRCA test result, another may accept her. Therefore, as dis-
cussed above, individuals are encouraged to shop around for insurance
policies even after a denial. However, the centralized database of the
MIB collects information about applicants.225 Once a company denies
an applicant, medical information may appear in the MIB system.
This distorts the market because an underwriter who sees medical in-
formation from another company may be more likely to scrutinize the
application and charge a higher premium or deny the policy, even in a
situation where the company’s risk appetite would have originally ac-
cepted the individual’s risk level. Additionally, many applicants are
likely unaware of the MIB, so they may not know the underlying rea-
son for any denials or premium increases.
222. See GAO Report, supra note 40, at 12 (“When sufficient information is not availa-
ble to compare products and prices, or when the consumer is not able to judge
product quality before purchase, consumers are unable to choose the best product
for themselves. Not being able to choose limits the consumer impact on the mar-
ket and reduces the competitive incentive to improve product quality and to lower
prices.”).
223. See Wortham, supra note 42, at 861 (noting other reasons consumers may fail to
find the lowest price, such as irrational behavior and inelastic consumer
demand).
224. See supra Part II.
225. See supra subsection V.B.1.
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A rational discrimination approach places the burden on insurance
companies to show they are justified in using information in risk clas-
sification. In contrast, the status quo places the burden on individuals
to shop for an insurance company that will consider their risk, to iden-
tify mistakes or misunderstandings made by insurers, and to appeal
these decisions or go elsewhere. Additionally, those choosing to un-
dergo clinical genetic testing or to participate in genomics research
must do so without a clear understanding of how such a test will im-
pact their insurability, leading to the patterns of avoidance of genetic
testing that were a concern prior to GINA’s passage.
C. The Arms Race of Risk Classification
Insurers are economically motivated to accurately classify risk or
jeopardize losing consumers to their competition, leaving risk classifi-
cation models susceptible to an arms-race mentality between insur-
ers.226 To increase their bottom line, insurers vie to attract as many
low-risk individuals to their pool as possible.227 The first insurer to
employ a new risk characteristic has a momentary competitive advan-
tage over its rival insurers when it can offer lower prices to those indi-
viduals in the new low-risk category.228 For example, historically,
insurers did not classify risk on the basis of smoking; however, the
first insurer to offer different tiers of policies for smokers and non-
smokers attracted the lower risk nonsmokers to its plan and deterred
smokers, who would be offered a lower premium from those insurers
still pooling risk across the broader risk class.229 Just as in weapons
arms races, the brief economic advantage is lost as soon as the compe-
tition employs the same new refined risk class, which leads to a re-
newed search for the next classification refinement and the next
competitive edge.
Meanwhile, the entire industry is spending increased resources
collecting data and verifying new risk classes. Early insurance policies
underwrote on three to four risk classes, such as age, gender, and ge-
ography; the system now operates complicated applications and medi-
226. Baker, supra note 33, at 377.
227. Stone, supra note 23, at 294–95.
228. See Baker, supra note 33, at 377; Thomas, supra note 66, at 121. However, Leah
Wortham notes possible reasons that insurers may not act in this manner at all
times: that income comes predominately from investments, that insurers do not
scrutinize cost of classification, and that insurers may be hesitant to introduce
new classifications. She ultimately concludes: “I agree with the economists’ pre-
diction . . . that once some insurers introduce a new classifier, other insurers are
pressured to follow suit from fear of adverse selection. At the same time, the pres-
sure on a company to first introduce the new classification may not be as strong
as posited.” Wortham, supra note 42, at 864–66.
229. See Allen M. Klein, Life Insurance Underwriting in the United States—Yesterday,
Today and Tomorrow, 18 BRIT. ACTUARIAL J. 486, 488–89 (2013).
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cal exams, involving actuaries and underwriters to assess the
numerous risk characteristics.230 All the while, the aggregate level of
risk across the population of insured individuals has probably
changed little.
Genomic data feeds directly into the frenzy of the risk classification
arms race, foreshadowing a potential transformation of how insurers
classify risk.231 The promise of genomics and precision medicine is far
from being realized. However, competitive pressures and incremental
improvements in clinical understanding of genetic risk could lead in-
surers to bifurcate risk classes into smaller and smaller refinements.
Suppose, for example, scientists discover a genetic variant that pro-
tects individuals against heart disease even when they have high
blood pressure. Insurers could use this information to refine the risk
class for those with high blood pressure into two smaller classes de-
pending on genetic risk. While this may increase the accuracy of risk
prediction and make the class more homogenous, increasingly smaller
risk classes may have less statistical credibility.232 On the other hand,
large genomic epidemiology studies may provide sufficient evidentiary
grounds to justify assumptions even for rare differences. Genetic se-
quencing and big data thus invite questions over whether small risk
classes are really a threat to the system in the way actuaries have
previously predicted.233
Auto insurance provides an apt illustration of how developing tech-
nology can vastly alter the process of risk classification. Traditionally,
auto insurers utilized factors such as age, gender, past traffic viola-
tions, occupation, and zip code as risk characteristics.234  Past traffic
violations and the number of miles driven have a fairly clear causal
path between the risk characteristic and expected cost—both the more
reckless a driver is, as measured by tickets, and the more miles a car
is on the road, as measured by mileage, directly increase the chances
of an accident. Ticket violations, although measurable, are an imper-
fect proxy for reckless behavior since not all reckless drivers will get
tickets while some safe drivers may get tickets. Mileage is also mea-
surable; however, it requires self-reporting or incurs added costs asso-
ciated with having an insurance representative collect and verify this
information.
230. Id. at 487–89.
231. For a discussion of the potential for other forms of big data to alter risk classifica-
tion, see generally Swedloff, supra note 121.
232. See supra subsection IV.C.1.
233. See Swedloff, supra note 121, at 344–45.
234. DIMITRIS KARAPIPERIS ET AL., USAGE-BASED INSURANCE AND VEHICLE TELEMATICS:
INSURANCE MARKET AND REGULATORY IMPLICATIONS 2 (Ctr. for Ins. Policy & Re-
search ed., 2015).
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Given advances in big data, tracking technology, and algorithms,
auto insurers are increasingly turning to usage-based insurance.235
Under usage-based insurance, auto insurance companies use telemat-
ics (in-vehicle telecommunication devices) to collect data, such as a
consumer’s location, miles driven, driving speed, and propensity to
make fast turns or hard brakes.236 The companies then input combi-
nations of these measured factors into algorithms to more narrowly
define risk classes based on individualized data.237 The lure of this
phenomenon to more precisely classify risk without the need to group
individuals into large risk classes is strong. Uptake of telematics is
rapid, and it is estimated by 2020, thirty-six percent of auto insurers
will utilize the software, showing the desire and trend for insurance
companies to rapidly adopt technology in risk classification, at first to
gain a competitive edge over other insurers but then just to remain as
competitive.238
The extent to which genomic sequencing will alter risk classifica-
tion remains to be seen; however, an arms-race mentality of risk clas-
sification creates insurer incentives to incorporate risk characteristics
before the competition. This could cause insurers to utilize a genetic
test as a risk characteristic before there is sufficient scientific evi-
dence of its predictive value.239 As scientific understanding of genetic
test results increases, when does misuse transition to acceptable use?
What was once a genetic test result with no predictive power may de-
velop into one that can be clinically used to assess risk. What level of
scientific knowledge is sufficient to push a genetic test result from un-
certain and unhelpful to a potential risk characteristic? Once clinically
relevant, does this automatically equate to relevance for insurers? Dif-
ferent insurance companies have different appetites for risk; some in-
surers may employ a genetic test result as a risk characteristic before
there is concrete scientific evidence in order to avoid unexpected costs
in the future, leading to arguable misuse of genetic test results.240 The
rational discrimination approach combats this potential misuse by re-
quiring documentation or oversight of scientific and clinical validity
before insurer use.
D. Fear of Genetic Discrimination
The greater transparency and oversight of the rational discrimina-
tion approach is also beneficial because it can dampen fears of genetic
235. See generally id.
236. Id. at 19.
237. Id. at 21.
238. Id. at 20.
239. See AM. COUNCIL OF LIFE INS., supra note 67, at 14–15.
240. Klitzman et al., supra note 1, at 1856 (“[C]onservative business decisions may
lead [insurers] to overestimate risks.”).
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discrimination in ways the market alone cannot. When genetic coun-
selors, health care professionals, or researchers are discussing issues
of genetic discrimination with patients and potential research sub-
jects, they must use broad language to describe the ability of life, long-
term care, and disability insurance companies to access and use ge-
netic test results. For example, an informed consent document for a
genomic-sequencing research project describes:
The Genetic Information Non-Discrimination Act of 2008 (GINA) is a federal
law that provides additional protection against genetic discrimination, specifi-
cally in the areas of employment and health insurance coverage. It does not
specifically cover long-term care insurance, life insurance and disability insur-
ance. Despite GINA and the legal protections it offers, the results generated in
this research could affect your future insurance eligibility or insurance premi-
ums. Before enrolling in this study you may wish to review your current insur-
ance coverage and explore life, long-term care and disability insurance
options.241
Although it would be difficult to narrow any statement, because it
is unclear when and how insurers are using genetic test results, this
type of broad language in consent documents and discussions poten-
tially leads individuals to believe insurers are using more genetic test
information than they actually are. In contrast, under the rational dis-
crimination framework of the United Kingdom, genetic counselors can
provide a succinct and clear message to patients and research partici-
pants: insurers will not use your predictive genetic test results unless
it is for HD and the policy is over £500,000.242  Even under the system
created by the Uniform Law Commission’s draft legislation, medical
professionals could direct patients and research subjects to the state
insurance commissioner’s office to examine which genetic tests insur-
ers filed documentation for and therefore which tests they are allowed
to consider.243 Greater transparency and clarity in the system could
ease fears of genetic discrimination among the general public and re-
move this commonly cited barrier to genetic testing and participation
in genetic research.244
This diminished fear of genetic discrimination is beneficial not only
for the public and research but also for insurance companies. Genomic
technologies are likely to lead to decreased mortality and morbidity as
241. CLINICAL SEQUENCING EXPLORATORY RESEARCH, PARTNERS HEALTHCARE SYSTEM
RESEARCH CONSENT FORM: THE MEDSEQ PILOT PROJECT: INTEGRATING WHOLE
GENOME SEQUENCING INTO CLINICAL MEDICINE, https://cser1.cser-consortium.org/
system/files/attachments/bwh_consentform_medseq_patients_cardiology_6.18.14
.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/F49N-69C4].
242. See supra subsection III.C.1.
243. DRAFT UNIFORM PROTECTION OF GENETIC INFORMATION IN EMPLOYMENT AND IN-
SURANCE ACT (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. LAWS 2010).
244. This system, of course, fails to address the fears and concerns of individuals with
positive test results for the conditions that have been approved. This gap will be
discussed in further detail infra section VIII.A.
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disease causes and pathways are understood, and preventive and mit-
igating strategies are developed.245 A healthier and longer living pub-
lic is also usually in insurers’ interests since it limits the number and
severity of claims.246 Insurers should have an interest in supporting a
regulatory framework that clarifies practices in this area. It will foster
good will towards the insurance industry and assuage fear of discrimi-
nation, which in turn can lead to not only socially desirable goals but
also better financial outcomes for insurers.
Turning back to the example of the woman with a pathogenic vari-
ant in BRCA1, suppose she has a sister who is unwilling to be tested
for fear of genetic discrimination. Based on her family history, the sis-
ter is at risk for ovarian cancer, but without testing there is little
clinical prevention she can undertake since screening for ovarian can-
cer is not as effective as screening for other cancers like breast or colon
cancer.247 If she receives such testing and is found to have a patho-
genic BRCA1 variant, she could undergo a prophylactic oophorec-
tomy.248 If this woman develops ovarian cancer and passes away, it is
not only a tragic death that could have potentially been avoided but
also leads to financial loss to her disability and life insurers.249 Thus,
both parties lose when fear of discrimination leads to avoidance of
testing.
Whether this situation could have been avoided and whether the
rational discrimination approach would have helped the situation or
led to denial depends on the scientific, clinical, and actuarial require-
ments established through the rational discrimination approach.
245. James P. Evans et al., We Screen Newborns, Don’t We?: Realizing the Promise of
Public Health Genomics, 15 GENETICS MED. 332, 332–33 (2013).
246. In some situations, increased longevity may place a financial strain on some ben-
efit mechanisms, such as pension plans. Similarly, if increased knowledge about
genetic causes of diseases allows us to prolong death, but not necessarily disease,
this could place a strain on long-term care and disability insurances. Overall,
however, a healthier society uses less insurance and therefore lowers claims and
financial burdens on the system.
247. See Susan M. Domchek et al., Association of Risk-Reducing Surgery in BRCA1 or
BRCA2 Mutation Carriers with Cancer Risk and Mortality, 304 JAMA 967, 967
(2010).
248. See id.
249. In some cases, the sister may have been charged an increased premium or been
denied insurance based on her family medical history alone. See Holmes, supra
note 25, at 565–66. However, insurers may fail to discover individuals with a
limited family history. For example, many insurers ask about the medical history
of grandparents, parents, and siblings but do not necessarily collect information
regarding great aunts, cousins, or other extended family. Baopeng Lu et al., The
Genetics of Breast and Ovarian Cancer IV: A Model of Breast Cancer Progression,
2011 SCANDINAVIAN ACTUARIAL J. 239.
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VII. STANDARDS OF EVIDENCE
The threshold levels of scientific, clinical, and actuarial evidence
required through a rational discrimination approach will greatly af-
fect the number and scope of genetic test results available for insurer
use. The United States and Australian proposals and the United King-
dom Moratorium each use similar frameworks for assessing whether
there is sufficient evidence for a genetic test to be used by an insur-
ance company. However, the details of these frameworks could drasti-
cally alter the scope of genetic information available to insurers.
A. Uniform Law Commission Draft
The Uniform Law Commission’s draft legislation “contemplates the
type of evidence-based review of genetic tests conducted by the Evalu-
ation of Genomic Applications in Practice and Prevention (EGAPP)
Working Group.”250 EGAPP, a working group established to provide
evidence-based assessment of genetic tests and genomic technologies,
employs the ACCE model as its evidentiary-assessment frame-
work.251 The ACCE model was developed based on recognition that in
an age of rapidly developing genomic technologies, there is a danger of
introducing under-researched and unsubstantiated genetic tests into
clinical practice to the harm of patients.252 Four criteria—analytical
validity, clinical validity, clinical utility, and ELSI (ethical, legal, and
social considerations)—comprise the elements of the ACCE frame-
work.253 The analytical validity measures how well the genetic test
works on a technical level, such as if the test will find a variant that is
present in a gene or whether the results are reliable and reproduci-
ble.254 Clinical validity refers to the predictive value of the test, in-
cluding consideration of the sensitivity and specificity.255 Clinical
utility examines whether the test measurably changes clinical out-
comes in terms of treatment or prevention, that is, whether it is help-
250. Draft Uniform Protection of Genetic Information in Employment and Insurance
Act (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. LAWS 2010).
251. Steven M. Teutsch et al., The Evaluation of Genomic Applications in Practice and
Prevention (EGAPP) Initiative: Methods of the EGAPP Working Group, 11 GENET-
ICS MED. 3 (2009). The ACCE Model was developed by the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC), based on recommendations by the Secretary’s Ad-
visory Committee on Genetic Testing and other groups, as a framework for as-
sessing the risks and benefits of genetic tests. SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON
GENETIC TESTING, ENHANCING THE OVERSIGHT OF GENETIC TESTS: RECOMMENDA-
TIONS OF THE SACGT (2000); Haddow & Palomaki, supra note 217, at 217.
252. See Muin. J. Khoury et al., The Evidence Dilemma in Genomic Medicine, 27
HEALTH AFF. 1600 (2008).
253. ACCE Model, supra note 180.
254. SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETIC TESTING, supra note 251, at 15.
255. Id. at 16; see text accompanying note 180.
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ful to the person taking the genetic test.256 Finally, the ACCE model
takes into account ELSI considerations of a test, such as whether the
test can lead to discrimination or stigmatization.257 The ACCE frame-
work is comprised of forty-four questions within the four criteria that
help to assess whether a genetic test should be implemented into
clinical care.258 Therefore, under a rational discrimination approach
mirroring the Uniform Law Commission, when providing documenta-
tion for each genetic test, insurers could utilize these questions as a
valuable starting point.
In the ACCE model, clinical utility is generally narrowed to only
clinical outcomes, although critics have argued that individuals may
obtain other types of personal utility from a test even if it does not
lead to clinical improvement.259 For example, a genetic test may end a
diagnostic odyssey or may allow individuals to make financial or other
life decisions in light of their genetic risk.260 Furthermore, increasing
dialogue has focused on the potential public health benefits of preven-
tive genetic screening, where individuals can learn about their risk
and prevent or mitigate future disease based on this knowledge.261
The EGAPP Working Group recently issued a recommendation that
the tumors of all newly diagnosed colorectal-cancer patients should be
sequenced for Lynch Syndrome, a genetic condition associated with an
increased risk of colon and endometrial cancer.262 EGAPP recom-
mends this testing not necessarily for the clinical benefit of the patient
but for the benefit to relatives in the form of discovering familial
risk.263 As the scope of utility expands from clinical utility to personal
and familial utility, there may be more patients with genetic test re-
256. See Scott D. Grosse & Muin J. Khoury, What Is the Clinical Utility of Genetic
Testing?, 8 GENETICS MED. 448, 448 (2006).
257. SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETIC TESTING, supra note 251, at 20.
258. ACCE Model, supra note 180.
259. Wylie Burke, Genetic Tests: Clinical Validity and Clinical Utility of Genetic Tests,
81 CURRENT PROTOCOLS HUM. GENETICS 9.15 (2014); Morris W. Foster et al.,
Evaluating the Utility of Personal Genomic Information, 11 GENETICS MED. 570
(2009); Grosse & Khoury, supra note 256; M.J. Khoury, Dealing with the Evi-
dence Dilemma in Genomics and Personalized Medicine, 87 CLINICAL PHARMACOL-
OGY & THERAPEUTICS 635 (2010).
260. Evans et al., supra note 15, at 862; Foster et al., supra note 259, at 571;
261. See, e.g., Evans et al., supra note 245; Robert C. Green et al., ACMG Recommen-
dations for Reporting of Incidental Findings in Clinical Exome and Genome Se-
quencing, 15 GENETICS MED. 565, 565–66 (2013); Muin J. Khoury et al.,
Population Screening in the Age of Genomic Medicine, 348 NEW ENG. J. MED. 50,
50 (2003); Mary-Claire King et al., Population-Based Screening for BRCA1 and
BRCA2: 2014 Lasker Award, 312 JAMA 1091 (2014).
262. Alfred O. Berg et al., Recommendations from the EGAPP Working Group: Genetic
Testing Strategies in Newly Diagnosed Individuals with Colorectal Cancer Aimed
at Reducing Morbidity and Mortality from Lynch Syndrome in Relatives, 11 GE-
NETICS MED. 35, 35 (2009).
263. Id.
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sults in their medical records that do not directly affect their clinical
care.
Although the Uniform Law Commission refers to the EGAPP as-
sessment for the type of documentation it envisioned, the ACCE model
was developed for recommendations in the clinical setting and misses
an essential aspect of evidence relevant in the insurance realm—actu-
arial calculations. While the ACCE model provides an excellent base-
line, since clinical validity and utility are essential aspects of fair use
of genetic test results by insurers, insurers should also consider and
prove how the genetic test results affect their actuarial calculations
and their business. For example, clinical care is enhanced by encour-
aging innovation and the introduction of new genetic tests to the mar-
ket while simultaneously balancing considerations of patient safety. It
is not beneficial to have such a restrictive application of the ACCE
model that genetic tests cannot be brought to market and industry
incentives for research are diminished.264 Thus, there are policy moti-
vations for easing the evidentiary threshold for incorporation into
clinical care. However, just because a genetic test reaches evidentiary
thresholds for clinical care does not automatically ensure the satisfac-
tion of actuarial thresholds. The experiences of the United Kingdom
and Australia highlight other factors that should be considered to de-
termine actuarial relevance.
B. U.K. Moratorium
Under the United Kingdom Moratorium and Concordat, in order to
gain approval for use of a genetic test, the ABI must submit an appli-
cation to GAIC proving three elements—technical, clinical, and actua-
rial relevance.265 In 2000, GAIC received eighteen applications
regarding the use of predictive genes for Huntington’s Disease, early-
onset Alzheimer’s Disease, and BRCA1/2 in life, critical illness, in-
come-protection, and long-term care insurance lines.266 However, be-
tween 2002 and 2003, GAIC updated its application standards,
approved the use of Huntington’s Disease in life insurance under
these standards, and asked the ABI to resubmit the remaining seven-
teen applications under the new standards.267 No revised or addi-
tional applications were ever submitted, and eventually GAIC was
264. See Khoury et al., supra note 252, at 1606 (“[A] high evidence threshold could
become a major disincentive for industry and academe to develop genomic
technology.”).
265. GAIC SECOND REPORT, supra note 65, at 6.
266. Id. at 7.
267. R.G. Thomas, Genetics and Insurance in the United Kingdom 1995–2010: The
Rise and Fall of “Scientific” Discrimination, 31 NEW GENETICS & SOC’Y 203, 206
(2012).
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disbanded in 2009.268 Although GAIC was disbanded, the application
process remains in effect; in order to use a predictive genetic test re-
sult, the insurance industry still needs to submit an application to the
government.
The first two standards of GAIC somewhat mirror the analytical
validity, clinical validity, and clinical utility standards of the ACCE
model. Under technical relevance, the ABI must disclose the number
of variants that occur across individuals affected with the condition,
the ability of the test to detect variants, the analytic precision, the
effect of family history on the interpretive value, and the extent of
“inherent weakness or technical imperfections” of the test and its in-
terpretation.269 Under clinical relevance, the GAIC application re-
quires disclosure of differential diagnoses; the clinical effects and
expected course of the condition; and the penetrance, prevalence, and
number of genes associated with the condition.270 Many of these re-
quirements speak directly to the factors that influence the positive
predictive value of the test.271
Unlike the Uniform Law Commission suggestion, the United King-
dom Moratorium explicitly adds a requirement of actuarial relevance.
To prove actuarial relevance, insurers must “[q]uantify the extra risk
justifying revised terms, for example the need to increase premiums
(or decline applications)” and demonstrate the methods and evidence
used in these calculations.272 Additionally, the insurers must illus-
trate how test results would affect insurance coverage and premium
amounts, and demonstrate how the availability of preventive inter-
ventions was considered in calculations.273 The lack of further appli-
cations by the ABI limits evidence of how these standards can and will
be applied to other genetic tests. It is unclear whether the ABI has
failed to resubmit applications because it does not think it is cost-ef-
fective to do so or because it does not have adequate evidence to prove
relevance under the strict GAIC standards. The GAIC experience,
however, shows how threshold standards can impact the number of
tests determined to have actuarial relevance.
C. Australian Guidance
In its report on insurance and genetics, the Australian Law Reform
working group highlighted two primary factors to establish relevance
268. GAIC SECOND REPORT, supra note 65, at 7; Thomas, supra note 267, at 206.
269. GAIC SECOND REPORT, supra note 65, at 21.
270. Id. at 22.
271. See supra section V.A.
272. GAIC SECOND REPORT supra note 65, at 23.
273. Id.
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for use by insurers—scientific reliability and actuarial relevance.274
“The first factor relates to the link between the existence of a genetic
mutation and the expression of a particular disorder; the second re-
lates to the link between the expression of disease and increased mor-
bidity or mortality.”275 Several of the factors the working group
considered relevant to scientific reliability are similar to GAIC’s in-
quiries into both technical and clinical relevance in the United King-
dom. For example, the Australian working group cited concerns of low
penetrance, available prevention and treatment, and variability of the
severity of symptoms associated with a gene.276
D. Additional Considerations
Although the specific overarching labels—such as technical rele-
vance or scientific reliability, clinical utility or relevance, and actua-
rial relevance—may change across countries, the underlying criteria
are similar. However, this Article argues that any requirement of doc-
umentation or standards of approval by an external body should in-
clude discussion of five specific considerations. These considerations
affect the clinical and technical relevance of genetic tests; they do not
necessarily need to be stand-alone considerations. However, they are
worth highlighting to ensure these factors are incorporated into the
larger criteria frameworks.
1. What Types of Evidence Are Sufficient?
Genetics is a rapidly developing field; therefore, the scientific cer-
tainty regarding the factors that affect the positive predictive value
are constantly evolving. At this point, the ability to collect and se-
quence genetic and genomic information is greater than the under-
standing of its clinical significance.277 For example, there are
approximately nineteen thousand genes in the human genome, only a
portion of which have known clinical relevance.278 Historically, evi-
dence for actuarial justification came from data collected by the insur-
ance company regarding the specific claims of those with certain risk
criteria—that is, calculations based on actual experience of the in-
surer.279 However, with rapid technological developments and discov-
274. ESSENTIALLY YOURS, supra note 91, at 700; HUMAN GENETICS COMM’N, INSIDE IN-
FORMATION: BALANCING INTERESTS IN THE USE OF PERSONAL GENETIC DATA (2002);
GAIC SECOND REPORT, supra note 65, at 23.
275. See GAIC SECOND REPORT, supra note 65, at 23.
276. ESSENTIALLY YOURS, supra note 91, at 700–01.
277. Evans et al., supra note 15.
278. See id. at 861; Green et al., supra note 261, at 566–67.
279. See ON RISK CLASSIFICATION, supra note 24, at 32, 38 (noting risk classification
determinations are often based on historical data). See generally ACTUARIAL STAN-
DARD OF PRACTICE NO. 23 (ACTUARIAL STANDARDS BD. 2011), http://www.actuari-
alstandardsboard.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/asop023_141.pdf [https://per
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ery, this data will not be available for quite some time for many
genetic tests.280  With the lack of data, it is unclear what type of evi-
dence insurers will use—they may rely on published epidemiological
studies, or they may rely on the opinions of researchers or health care
professionals. Reliance solely on epidemiological studies is potentially
problematic, even if they are done with scientific rigor.281
We must accept that epidemiological work is aimed largely at medical ques-
tions, and so the methods of medical statistics will figure largely. These may
have a basis in common with actuarial science, for example in survival analy-
sis, but there are differences of practice and emphasis. Actuarial models, even
the ordinary life table, are in fact exceptionally demanding of the data, by
requiring detailed, age-dependent risk estimates. Not many medical studies,
especially into rare disorders in respect of which samples may be small, meet
these demands.282
Beyond published studies, the Actuarial Standards Board allows
expert opinions to be considered: “In demonstrating [an actuarial] re-
lationship, the actuary may use relevant information from any relia-
ble source, including statistical or other mathematical analysis of
available data. The actuary may also use clinical experience and ex-
pert opinion.”283 Guidance should delineate the bounds of such expert
advice, such as necessary independence, number of opinions required,
and credentials of the expert.284
2. How Should the Context of Genetic Tests Come into Play?
There are three primary contexts in which individuals may have
undergone medical genetic testing: clinical testing, research testing,
and direct-to-consumer (DTC) testing.285 Insurance companies are
most likely to gather information regarding clinical testing through
ma.unl.edu/HV9W-PDEF] (discussing standards of practice for actuaries when
using data provided by others).
280. J. LEMAIRE & A.S. MACDONALD, GENETICS, FAMILY HISTORY, AND INSURANCE UN-
DERWRITING: AN EXPENSIVE COMBINATION? 8–9 (2003).
281. E.g., Li Lu et al., Premium Rates Based on Genetic Studies: How Reliable Are
They?, 42 INSURANCE 319, 329 (2008) (finding the reliability of premiums based
on epidemiological studies varied depending on the number of cases within age
brackets of interest).
282. LEMAIRE & MACDONALD, supra note 280.
283. ACTUARIAL STANDARD OF PRACTICE NO. 12 § 3.2.1 (ACTUARIAL STANDARDS BD.
2005), http://www.actuarialstandardsboard.org/pdf/asops/asop012_101.pdf
[https://perma.unl.edu/EVA2-EPXR].
284. These discussions can benefit from the growing use of evidence-based underwrit-
ing. See generally Ine Van Hoyweghen & Klasien Horstman, Evidence-Based Un-
derwriting in the Molecular Age: The Politics of Reinsurance Companies Towards
the Genetics Issue, 28 NEW GENETICS & SOC’Y 317 (2009).
285. Given the ties to insurance, this Article focuses on medical genetic testing and
not genetic testing for other purposes such as paternity, criminal investigation,
newborn screening, or ancestry testing. These types of genetic tests could be con-
ducted in settings and contexts different than those discussed here for medical
testing.
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direct questions of medical professionals and medical records. Individ-
uals are most likely to undergo clinical genetic testing when they have
some symptoms or family history that indicates possible increased
risk, making these results simultaneously of interest to insurers but
also less relevant if the insurers can gather the same information
through family history or other clinical information. However, just be-
cause genetic or genomic testing is conducted in a clinical setting does
not guarantee its clinical relevance.286
Insurers are also likely to be interested in any genetic testing done
in a research setting. There is ongoing debate about whether genetic
research results should be used by insurers for two primary reasons:
testing done in the research setting does not always conform to the
same laboratory standards as for those conducted in the clinical set-
ting, and potential insurer use of research results deters individuals
from enrolling in research studies.287 In some countries, insurers are
prohibited from using or have agreed not to use research results in
risk classification.288 The boundaries between research and clinical
care, however, are increasingly blurring. Today, genetic research re-
sults, even those that are incidental or secondary to the primary re-
search question, are often returned to participants.289 Thus, genetic
research results may be just as valuable as clinical results for insur-
ers. For example, in Canada, prior to the latest bill, insurers would
not seek information about genetic research results that were not re-
turned to participants; if the individual or physicians had access to the
results, however, the Canadian insurers wanted equal access to the
information.290
In the United States, arguments concerning differential standards
are likely less relevant for recent research results. The Clinical Labo-
ratory Improvement Act of 1988 (CLIA), an act that promulgates and
enforces standards for laboratories performing genetic testing, gener-
ally exempts research testing laboratories from regulations.291 How-
ever, it requires any research results returned to participants for
“diagnosis, prevention or treatment of any disease or impairment of,
or the assessment of the health of individual patients” be certified in a
286. See supra section VII.A. Another example of this could be genetic testing for preg-
nant women or for those considering pregnancy.
287. Yann Joly et al., Life Insurance: Genomic Stratification and Risk Classification,
22 EUR. J. HUM. GENETICS 575, 577 (2014).
288. Id.; Margaret Otlowski et al., Genetic Discrimination: International Perspectives,
13 ANN. REV. GENOMICS & HUM. GENETICS 433, 441 (2012).
289. See Gail P. Jarvik et al., Return of Genomic Results to Research Participants: The
Floor, the Ceiling, and the Choices in Between, 94 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 818
(2014).
290. CANADIAN LIFE & HEALTH INS. ASS’N, INDUSTRY CODE: GENETIC TESTING INFORMA-
TION FOR INSURANCE UNDERWRITING § 4.3 (2017).
291. 42 C.F.R. § 493.3(b)(2) (2013).
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laboratory that meets clinical standards.292 Therefore, returned re-
search results will most likely have gone through the same rigorous
requirements of clinical validity as genetic tests conducted through
clinical care. Although this minimizes the arguments related to stan-
dards and quality of results, concerns remain regarding potential de-
terrence from participating in the research.
In addition to testing through research or clinical care, individuals
may also have genetic test results through DTC testing. In 2013, the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) began regulating health-related
DTC tests.293 Companies must now obtain authorization from the
FDA by proving the analytic and clinical validity of each test in order
to market it directly to consumers.294 This requirement essentially
halted the health-related DTC market in the United States, and the
markets have not fully reformulated, although they are beginning
to.295 In the meantime, DTC results from prior to the FDA crackdown
may remain of interest to insurers. DTC test results raise greater con-
cerns of adverse selection because the information is less likely to be
housed in the medical record and, indeed, the individual may have
even sought this type of testing to avoid insurer discovery.
3. Should Relevance Be Measured by Marginal Added Value?
Actuarial relevance requires insurers to demonstrate a risk char-
acteristic is associated with an increased risk for disease. However,
when assessing the strength of this association, a baseline question is:
An increased risk as compared to what? Insurers already employ in-
formation about individuals’ family history and clinical information to
determine one’s risk of genetic conditions. In the United Kingdom,
GAIC asked insurers to show not just that a genetic test result was
correlated with increased risk but how the risk compared with the in-
surer’s current ability to assess risk.296 If actuarial relevance is de-
fined by the marginal benefit a risk characteristic provides over
characteristics currently in use, this would significantly lower the im-
292. Id.
293. Patricia J. Zettler et al., 23andMe, the Food and Drug Administration, and the
Future of Genetic Testing, 174 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 493, 493 (2014). There is
still an ongoing DTC market for other purposes such as ancestry testing.
294. Id.
295. See Kayte Spector-Bagdady, “The Google of Healthcare”: Enabling the Privatiza-
tion of Genetic Bio/Databanking, 26 ANNALS EPIDEMIOLOGY 515 (2016).
296. GAIC SECOND REPORT, supra note 65, at 23 (requiring insurers to show “how the
use of normal/abnormal test results may affect the ratio of people accepted for
insurance and the additional premiums they may be asked to pay in comparison
with those for whom the only indicator of risk would previously have been an
adverse family history”).
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pact of the characteristic being assessed.297 For example, many ge-
netic conditions will develop at ages earlier than most individuals get
insurance or could be identified through clinical means other than ge-
netic testing; thus, the marginal benefit of genetic test results will be
limited.298 If the potential to learn of hereditary risk through family
history is removed, then the impact genetic testing will have on actua-
rial relevance is much greater.
4. How Should Preventive and Treatment Measures Be Taken
into Account?
The extent to which preventive and treatment measures are avail-
able to mitigate risk by definition alters the original risk assessment
of insurers. The availability of preventive measures is an important
component of clinical utility and was specifically considered in both
the United Kingdom and Australian contexts.299 The genomics litera-
ture refers to “medically actionable” genetic conditions—that is, those
with preventive measures, treatment measures, or both available to
lower one’s risk of developing the condition or ameliorate its im-
pact.300 There is a growing consensus that information about medi-
cally actionable genetic conditions should be returned to individuals in
both the clinical and research settings.301 For example, in 2013 the
American College of Medical Genetics and Genomics (ACMG) issued
guidance suggesting the results of fifty-six predetermined, medically
actionable genetic conditions should be returned to the patient any
time whole-genome or whole-exome sequencing is conducted.302 The
ACMG believed that genetic and genomic testing can lead to preven-
297. See Macdonald & Yu, supra note 66, at 345–46 (noting only a limited number of
genetic conditions will have marginal benefit for insurance because there are few
that are late onset, will not be discovered through symptoms or family history,
will not have effective treatment once discovered, and will have sufficient predic-
tive value).
298. See AM. COUNCIL OF LIFE INS., supra note 67, at 26.
299. See supra sections VII.B–C.
300. Jonathan S. Berg et al., An Informatics Approach to Analyzing the Incidentalome,
15 GENETICS MED. 36 (2012); Green et al., supra note 261.
301. Jarvik et al., supra note 289.
302. Green et al., supra note 261. This position garnered heated debate over the next
several years regarding consent, the right not to know genetic information, and
return of results. See Wylie Burke et al., Recommendations for Returning Geno-
mic Incidental Findings? We Need to Talk!, 15 GENETICS MED. 854 (2013);
Thomas May, On the Justifiability of ACMG Recommendations for Reporting of
Incidental Findings in Clinical Exome and Genome Sequencing, 43 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 134 (2015); Susan M. Wolf et al., Patient Autonomy and Incidental Find-
ings in Clinical Genomics, 340 SCIENCE 1049 (2013). Despite ultimate changes to
the form of consent, the underlying motivation and principle behind the recom-
mendation stands. ACMG Bd. of Dirs., ACMG Policy Statement: Updated Recom-
mendations Regarding Analysis and Reporting of Secondary Findings in Clinical
Genome-scale Sequencing, 17 GENETICS MED. 68 (2014).
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tion or mitigation of disease and that individuals and their families
should be given this information to lessen the burden of disease in our
society.303
Medically advisable prevention of genetic conditions is one of the
primary societal reasons to encourage increased genetic testing and is
why fear of genetic discrimination minimizing uptake of testing is
bemoaned. If insurers classify risk on the basis of a genetic condition
but do not fully consider the impact of potential preventive measures,
this will only add to the entrenched problems of fear of genetic dis-
crimination and mistrust of the insurance system. To return to the
example above of the woman with a pathogenic BRCA1 variant, sup-
pose she is now considering a prophylactic oophorectomy, a preventive
removal of ovaries, to minimize the risk of ovarian and breast cancer.
This procedure lowers the woman’s risks of ovarian and breast cancer
by ninety-six percent and fifty-three percent.304 If insurers learn of
the woman’s genetic risk and deny her insurance despite the availabil-
ity of preventive measures, is this actuarially justified or fair? Requir-
ing insurers to fully consider the actuarial impact of preventive
measures is a necessary component in order to meet societal goals of
disease prevention and ensure actuarial fairness. In some situations,
the preventive measure will not be as effective as the case of a preven-
tive surgery for BRCA1/2; in such cases, the individual may still face
an increased premium, but insurers should still be required to have
actuarially sufficient evidence to raise premiums based on conditions
with the preventive measures available.
5. How Should Variants Within a Gene Be Considered?
The thresholds of actuarial relevance must address not only which
genetic tests insurers can use to classify risk but also how insurers
should use specific results from a genetic test or condition. Actuarial
relevance should be measured not just across genes but across vari-
ants and subpopulations.
For most genetic tests, the molecular analysis is not looking for one
simple on–off switch that indicates whether a person either has or
does not have the genetic predisposition. Instead, genetic testing ana-
303. For a discussion of the changes to the consent procedures, see Updated ACMG
Recommendations to Allow Patient Opt Out of Incidental Findings, GENOMEWEB
(Apr. 1, 2014), http://www.genomeweb.com/clinical-genomics/updated-acmg-rec-
ommendations-allow-patient-opt-out-incidental-findings. But see Anya E.R.
Prince, Prevention for Those Who Can Pay: Insurance Reimbursement of Genetic-
Based Preventive Interventions in the Liminal State Between Health and Disease,
2 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 365 (2015), for a critique of the assumption that knowledge
of genetic risk equates to ability to prevent disease.
304. R.I. Olivier et al., Clinical Outcome of Prophylactic Oophorectomy in BRCA1/
BRCA2 Mutation Carriers and Events During Follow-Up, 90 BRIT. J. CANCER
1492, 1492 (2004).
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lyzes individuals’ specific sequences of chemical base pairs in the gene
of interest, and then testing laboratories compare this to a reference
genome to identify variants (permanent changes in the genetic se-
quence).305 Variants in all genes are very, very common, but very few
variants will indicate an increased risk of disease, even if they occur in
a gene that is known to be associated with a certain disease.306 Thus,
determining the results of a genetic test requires complex variant in-
terpretation, which often involves individualized assessment based on
race, ethnicity, age, symptoms, and family history of disease.307
The ACMG recently issued guidance for the interpretation of vari-
ants in single-gene conditions.308 It established five categories of clas-
sification for variants—pathogenic, likely pathogenic, uncertain
significance, likely benign, and benign—and delineated the types of
evidence that could be used for laboratories to place each variant into
each classification.309 Other types of genetic tests require different va-
riant interpretation, such as the test for Huntington’s Disease, which
identifies the number of times a certain genetic sequence repeats,
called copy-number variants.310 Variant interpretation will be even
more complicated in multigene conditions.
Given the complexities of interpreting the clinical significance of
variants, there is often disagreement across laboratories regarding
the appropriate label for identified variants.311 Efforts to increase con-
sistency, like the ACMG standards, and centralized variant databases
where researchers report their interpretations, will improve inter-lab-
oratory consistency.312 However, the extent of laboratory disagree-
305. Richards et al., supra note 167, at 406.
306. Id.
307. See generally D.G. MacArthur et al., Guidelines for Investigating Causality of Se-
quence Variants in Human Disease, 508 NATURE 469 (2014); Richards et al.,
supra note 167; Steven Benowitz, Genomics’ Daunting Challenge: Identifying
Variants that Matter, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES. INST. (Apr. 23, 2014), https://
www.genome.gov/27556983/genomics-daunting-challenge-identifying-variants-
that-matter [https://perma.unl.edu/7LHY-LB6C].
308. Richards et al., supra note 167, at 406. The ACMG refers to these conditions as
Mendelian disorders.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 407.
311. Laura M. Amendola et al., Actionable Exomic Incidental Findings in 6503 Par-
ticipants: Challenges of Variant Classification, 25 GENOME RES. 305, 306 (2015);
Amendola et al., Performance of Interpretation Guidelines, supra note 170, at
1070 (finding prior to consensus talks there was only thirty-four percent concor-
dance across labs in variant classification); Sara L. Van Driest et al., Association
of Arrhythmia-Related Genetic Variants with Phenotypes Documented in Elec-
tronic Medical Records, 315 JAMA 47, 50–51, 55 (2016).
312. Amendola et al., Performance of Interpretation Guidelines, supra note 170, at
1070–71, 1075 (finding laboratory consensus increased after discussion about the
ACMG guidelines).
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ment should be considered when assessing the technical credibility of
actuarial relevance.313
The complications of variant interpretation raise important consid-
erations as to how specific test results should be used by insurance
companies. For example: Should insurers use variants of uncertain
significance (VUS)? Must insurers use the variant classification that
was reported from the patient’s laboratory, or can the insurer curate
its own list of variant classifications? If insurers ever begin to under-
take their own genetic testing, what standards of variant interpreta-
tion must they employ? How individualized must their assessment be
with regard to the symptoms and familial evidence from the individ-
ual applicant? These and other similar questions must be considered
and debated from the perspectives of insurers, scientists, and consum-
ers alike. However, it is clear insurer use of genetic test results cannot
simply end at an inquiry into which tests have sufficient data. For
example, perhaps sufficient actuarial data could support insurer use
of the woman’s BRCA1 test; however, further clarification is needed
regarding whether insurers can charge a higher rate to those with a
VUS or another given variant.
VIII. THE CASE FOR A RATIONAL DISCRIMINATION
APPROACH
A rational discrimination approach recognizes the complexities
and potential for misunderstanding and misuse of emerging genetic
test results but balances this with the need of insurers to access and
use information that is actuarially relevant. The additional documen-
tation and, in the case of Australia and United Kingdom, external ap-
proval depart from the traditional deferential oversight of the
insurance industry. However,
[g]one are the days when applicants had a deferential attitude towards highly
respected financial institutions. In these days of openness, transparency and
accountability there will be pressure for insurers to develop and to demon-
strate the scientific basis for all of their underwriting policies and decisions
and to disclose much more to prospective policyholders on how they are
viewed by the underwriting process, especially when they are rated up or re-
fused cover.314
Indeed, deference to the insurance industry is a problematic means of
controlling use of genetic test results since insurers may have the in-
centive to set low thresholds of evidence, especially in a competitive
market where each insurer desires to be the first to incorporate new,
313. Indeed, this is already incorporated in the ACCE forty-four questions. Under an-
alytic validity, the CDC asks reviewers to consider the within-and-between labo-
ratory precision. ACCE Model, supra note 180.
314. Daykin et al., supra note 30, at 824.
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more accurately refined risk classes.315 To counter these incentives,
necessary evidence levels are best defined externally, ideally through
incorporation of independent approval.
A. Prohibitive Approach Comparison
Regulating insurer use of genetic test results through a rational
discrimination approach is by no means a panacea. Given the ability
of genetic and genomic tests to provide information about individuals’
predisposition to certain conditions, an increasing number of genetic
tests may provide useful and actuarially relevant information to in-
surers as scientific understanding improves. Depending on the stan-
dards of actuarial relevance that are chosen, an actuarial model may
not prevent individuals with pathogenic variants in these genes from
being charged higher premiums or from being denied insurance out-
right. Some may critique this as minimizing the social solidarity goals
of insurance and leaving the groups at the highest risk without protec-
tion. Yet, public debate about standards of actuarial relevance in-
creases the chances thresholds are set in a fair and unbiased way and
are beneficial to many across society.
This is not to say that a prohibitive approach is the wrong ap-
proach. Indeed, this Article has not attempted to assess which ap-
proach, prohibitive or rational discrimination, would be preferable. It
does, however, argue a rational discrimination approach is preferable
to the status quo approach because the status quo fails to adequately
address fear of discrimination, places burdens on insurance applicants
in an opaque insurance market, and leaves insurers vulnerable to in-
centives to use risk characteristics before sufficient scientific and ac-
tuarial evidence is established.316
It is in the interest of both insurers and society as a whole to limit
misuse of genetic test results—and indeed all risk characteristics—in
risk classification. While insurer use of the highly penetrant genetic
conditions that would be most likely to satisfy evidence standards can
and should be debated regarding social fairness concerns, such as ac-
cess to insurance, privacy, and stigmatization, these are distinct from
concerns of misuse leading to economic efficiencies.
There is a difference . . . between that which is undesirable because it is eco-
nomically irrational and that which is undesirable because, despite its eco-
nomic logic, it offends our common understanding of fairness. In the former
315. Similarly, insurers are incentivized to make more conservative decisions, espe-
cially for new diseases with little historical and actuarial data. John H. Dodge,
Predictive Medical Information and Underwriting, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 36, 38
(2007) (noting because life insurance policies can not be altered in the future to
raise rates, but can be altered to lower rates, prudent insurers will make con-
servative decisions in cases of limited evidence).
316. See supra Part VI.
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case, the government simply acts to correct the market; in the latter, it ac-
cepts a deliberate market distortion in order to reinforce a moral stance.317
The rational discrimination approach is one that seeks to correct the
market but does not overstep into distorting the market out of social
fairness concerns. It may be the case that, given the rarity of highly
predictive single-gene conditions, adopting a prohibitive approach will
have limited financial impact on the insurance industry. However,
this is something that will be easier and clearer to measure when fo-
cusing on those conditions that are actuarially relevant rather than on
all genetic test results—in other words, targeting only rational dis-
crimination, not irrational discrimination. Social fairness arguments
that combine both actuarially justified and actuarially unjustified ge-
netic test results may inadvertently suggest a larger impact on insur-
ers than actually exists.
B. Status Quo Comparison
Any policy to increase oversight of the risk classification systems of
insurers is likely to be met with opposition from the insurance indus-
try itself. Indeed, the failure of the recommendations in both the
United States and Australia suggests successful pushback to in-
creased oversight. The question is what specific concerns the industry
may have over such an approach. Several possibilities are immedi-
ately apparent: (1) the worry that providing increased documentation
will result in administrative expense; (2) a concern that public disclo-
sure of internal calculations and the risk characteristics employed
would cause insurers to lose their competitive edge against other in-
surance companies; and (3) the fear that limited use of genetic test
results would create regulatory adverse selection. While each of these
have some validity, the concerns can be limited and in the end do not
outweigh the social concerns of fear of genetic discrimination and fair-
ness in insurance risk classification.
A worry of increased administrative expense should be minimal for
insurance companies. Unfair trade practice acts in all fifty states al-
ready require life insurers, and often other insurers, to have actuarial
justification for use of risk characteristics.318 Therefore, a rational dis-
crimination approach in the United States would require documenta-
tion of a standard that is already in place. Depending on the nature of
the documentation required, there will, of course, be administrative
costs added in order to convert internal decisions into external docu-
ments, but the actuarial calculations and considerations legally
should have already been conducted. Additionally, these administra-
tive costs to the insurers can be minimized if the rational discrimina-
317. Jeffrey S. Morrow, Insuring Fairness: The Popular Creation of Genetic Antidis-
crimination, 98 GEO. L.J. 215, 227 (2009).
318. See supra Part II.
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tion approach includes oversight and review by an external or
independent committee. This could remove the administrative costs of
collecting information about each genetic test and determining
whether it meets set standards for each insurance company separately
and replace it with a streamlined, centralized process.
Due to the competitive nature of insurance, companies may not
want public disclosure of their actuarial calculations and the specific
genetic tests they employ in their risk classification. Proposals, such
as the draft by the Uniform Law Commission, do add an element of
public disclosure to the insurance process. Depending on the nature of
the required disclosure, the amount of information made public could
vary. For example, a system could be created to disclose more to the
insurance commissioner than is made public. Here too, an external
advisory body could actually benefit companies by leveling the playing
field across insurers. Risk classification is an expensive process; insur-
ers need to invest resources to collect data, interpret the risk associ-
ated with this data, and set premium levels appropriately.319 While
insurers are incentivized to create ever-more-refined classifications in
competitive markets,320 setting standards across all insurance compa-
nies may decrease costs of the risk classification process.
Finally, insurer concerns over adverse selection can and should be
minimized by the process as well. For example, under the United
Kingdom Moratorium and Concordat, insurers provide evidence of
how a genetic test would affect premiums and insurance coverage.321
This provides an opportunity to demonstrate whether adverse selec-
tion would result if insurers cannot gather information about a genetic
test result. Adverse selection, if it does occur, is most likely to occur
with highly predictive and scientifically valid tests; the very tests that
could be approved under a rational discrimination approach. Minimiz-
ing insurer use of tests that are scientifically unfounded or have mini-
mal predictive value will hardly lead to the spiraling insurance costs
and collapse of the system forewarned by adverse selection.
The United Kingdom provides an example of how even restrictions
on the use of highly predictive genetic tests has not led to substan-
tially increased cost or evidence of adverse selection. The United King-
dom Moratorium was instituted in 2001 for a five-year period and has
been repeatedly extended since that time.322 While it is difficult, if not
impossible, to concretely measure adverse selection in the market, the
fact that United Kingdom insurers voluntarily agreed to continue the
moratorium for over fifteen years indicates they have not seen evi-
dence of an increase in unexpected costs from their insurance pools
319. See, e.g, The Economics of Insurance Law, supra note 62, at 45–46.
320. Thomas, supra note 66, at 121; see supra section VI.C.
321. See supra section VII.B.
322. Thomas, supra note 267, at 206.
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despite their inability to collect and use the vast majority of predictive
genetic tests.
The United Kingdom also provides an illustration of a political cal-
culation by insurers. In the late 1990s, the United Kingdom govern-
ment considered a prohibitive ban on insurer use of genetic test
results.323 The insurance industry was adamantly opposed to such
legislation, citing concerns such as the need to access genetic test re-
sults and adverse selection.324 Eventually, however, the industry real-
ized it was likely to face a prohibitive ban on using a broad range of
genetic test results and agreed to the Moratorium and Concordat
under a rational discrimination approach as a compromise.325 There-
fore, it may be in the interest of insurers to accept a rational discrimi-
nation approach as a flexible option that allows continued
reassessment of scientific advances in genetics in lieu of a potential
prohibitive approach in the future.326
IX. CONCLUSION
Much of the controversy and difficulty of using genetic test results
during risk classification stems from the nascent state of genetic sci-
ence. Although the science has greatly advanced since the completion
of the Human Genome Project in 2003, there is still much that is not
understood about the clinical implications of genes. One prominent
question is how to combine the use of information with potentially
mercurial implications into the framework of insurance risk classifica-
tion. A common trope employed by those advocating for a prohibitive
approach on insurer use of genetic test results is that “all of us have
something bad in our genes.”327 The statement, although perhaps an
effective discursive tactic, is incomplete. It draws on the fear of genetic
discrimination and encourages everyone to feel they are just one ge-
netic test away from the inability to secure insurance. From a social
fairness perspective, this is an understandably persuasive tactic. It
draws people behind Rawls’s veil of ignorance and asks them to de-
velop policy without knowing what their genetic lottery may be. How-
ever, from an actuarial perspective, it is not helpful to condense all
genetic conditions into one discussion. The average person will have
approximately three to four million genetic variants that are different
323. Id. at 205.
324. Id. at 206–10.
325. Id. at 206.
326. Canada also provides an illustration. Until recently, the country followed a status
quo approach, but a bill was passed by Parliament in 2017 that adopted an ex-
pansive prohibitive approach despite industry disapproval. See Genetic Non-Dis-
crimination Act, S.C. 2017, c 3 (Can.). If the industry had accepted or advocated
for a rational discrimination approach, as in the United Kingdom, the political
dynamics could be quite different.
327. See Wolf & Kahn, supra note 111, at 13.
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than the reference genome—at least one of these, and likely many
more, will increase an individual’s risk for disease.328 Others may be
protective or lower one’s risk.329 Most will have no effect on risk at
all.330 Additionally, while all of us will have some “bad” genes, very
few will have genetic predispositions to the highly penetrant, single-
gene conditions so often cited as the poster children of insurer use.
A rational discrimination approach creates a regulatory-enforce-
ment system that is transparent, clear, and flexible. This approach
finds common ground between societal concerns over unfair misuse of
genetic test results and insurer acknowledgement of the lack of actua-
rial evidence for the use of most results. Through continuing genomic
research efforts, there will be a more robust understanding of the
clinical implications across the entire human genome and the associ-
ated possible preventive measures and treatments. When this day
comes, insurer use of genetic test results may become less worrisome
and controversial, and more like the current use of family history or
other common medical information. After all, we all have a genetic
risk for something, and hopefully in the future we will be able to re-
turn to a model of broad risk pooling across genetic conditions rather
than strong differentiation between those with known bad genetic
luck and those whose genetic misfortune is yet to be discovered. Until
that time, to minimize misuse and ease societal concerns, the addi-
tional transparency and oversight of a rational discrimination ap-
proach should be adopted as a baseline policy.
328. Evans et al., supra note 209.
329. Id.
330. Id.
